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TAX LAW’S LOSS OBSESSION
Emily Cauble*
Abstract
This Article will address tax law’s inconsistent treatment of gains and
losses—focusing in particular on certain instances in which a taxpayer is
prevented from shifting a built-in loss to another taxpayer but would be
allowed to shift a built-in gain to another taxpayer. The article will explore
whether any legitimate justification can explain the inconsistency. Finding
no such legitimate justification for at least some of the examples, this
Article will conclude that lawmakers ought to have also addressed gains
and the failure to do so results from lawmakers crafting an overly narrow
response that addressed only the most recent, high-profile gimmick in
engineering transactions to reduce tax liability.
INTRODUCTION
Regulatory gamesmanship by sophisticated parties is pervasive. Wealthy, welladvised businesses, individuals, and other regulated parties craft their transactions
and organize their affairs to obtain the most favorable possible outcomes, given the
existing legal framework. Sophisticated enterprises arrange their activities to reduce
the effective tax rate applicable to the income generated by those activities, and they
take steps to mitigate the burden imposed by other regulatory regimes. When
regulators become apprised of the convoluted maneuvers undertaken to evade
existing regulations, sometimes those regulators respond with law reform measures
to close the existing loopholes, putting an end to the most recent schemes.
Sophisticated parties respond, in turn, by uncovering new loopholes and crafting
new strategies to mitigate the effects of the new regulations. Then the cycle repeats.
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The story in the preceding paragraph is a familiar tale and a true one.1 When
telling this story, it is easy to portray as inevitable the recurrent cycle of
gamesmanship by sophisticated parties, followed by regulatory response, followed,
in turn, by new tricks to evade the spirit of the new regulations. While the
inevitability of the cycle, to some extent, cannot be denied, this Article will argue
that in some circumstances, the short-sightedness of the regulatory response is at
least partially to blame for the perpetuation of the cycle. In particular, some
regulatory measures foreclose opportunities to engage in whatever transaction has
caught the relevant regulator’s attention most recently but fail to address other, very
closely related (and, therefore, very predictable) transactions.
As an example, this Article will address tax law’s inconsistent treatment of
gains and losses—focusing particularly on certain instances in which a taxpayer is
prevented from shifting a built-in loss to another taxpayer but would be allowed to
shift a built-in gain to another taxpayer. This Article will explore whether any
legitimate justification can explain the inconsistency. Finding no such legitimate
justification for at least some of the examples, this Article will conclude that the
inconsistency represents an example of short-sightedness in the lawmaking process
that sustains the continued cycle of regulated parties outmaneuvering the new
regulations and regulators responding but always staying at least one step behind.
At this point, further explanation of the examples used by this Article is in
order. If a taxpayer holds an asset that has increased (or decreased) in value,
1

See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, H.R. ____, The Anti-Skunk Works Corporate Tax Shelter
Act of 1999, 1999 TAX NOTES 443, 445 (“Loopholes can be created in any human tax system
unless the system is defended and repaired. Shelters take razor-thin fissures of no material
concern and turn them into gaping holes in the tax base.”); Noël B. Cunningham & James R.
Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 33 (2004) (“[P]romoters could
easily concoct new abusive transactions that literally complied with the rule.”); Victor
Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010) (“[T]he most effective
techniques are more pernicious, crafted by lawyers to meet the letter of the law while
undermining its spirit, successful only until the government discovers and closes the
loophole.”); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA.
TAX REV. 339, 366 (2005) (“[I]t simply is not possible to write tax laws that are devoid of
all unintended loopholes.”); Martin J. McMahon Jr., Beyond a GAAR: Retrofitting the Code
to Rein in 21st Century Tax Shelters, 2003 TAX NOTES 1721, 1722 (“The mechanical terms
of specific rules . . . provide a tremendous temptation to treat the rules as an instruction
manual for creating and structuring transactions outside the ordinary course of business or
normal investments in which the taxpayer would not engage except as a result of the tax
avoidance potential of the inventive transaction.”); Andrea Monroe, What’s in a Name: Can
the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule Really Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 401, 409 (2010) [hereinafter Monroe, What’s in a Name] (“[T]hese flaws create a
playground for those who engage in transactions that comply with . . . literal language, yet
result in tax consequences that Congress did not contemplate.”); Daniel N. Shaviro & David
A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner, 2002 TAX NOTES
511, 512–13; David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 860
(1999) [hereinafter Weisbach, Formalism] (“[T]axpayers have been able to manipulate the
rules endlessly to produce results clearly not intended by the drafters”).
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generally, the taxpayer will not realize the resulting gain (or loss) for tax purposes
until the taxpayer sells the asset for cash or exchanges it for other consideration.2 If
and when the taxpayer does sell or exchange the asset, the taxpayer will realize the
resulting gain (or loss). At that time, in the case of gain, generally the taxpayer
includes the resulting gain in income, subjecting the gain to tax at the taxpayer’s
effective tax rate,3 and, in the case of loss, the taxpayer may be entitled to deduct the
loss (saving tax at the taxpayer’s effective tax rate).4
Instead of selling an asset, an individual might transfer the asset to another
individual as a gift. If the asset has increased in value in the donor’s hands, the donor
will not recognize the accrued gain (referred to as “built-in gain”) at the time of the
gift, but, upon a subsequent sale of the property, the donee will recognize that gain,
provided that the asset maintains its value.5 If the donor had sold the property, the
built-in gain would have been subject to tax at the donor’s effective tax rate, but, as
a result of the gift, the built-in gain will be subject to tax at the donee’s effective tax
rate instead.6 This maneuver results in tax savings if the effective tax rate of the
donee is lower than that of the donor.7 If the asset has decreased in value in the
donor’s hands, the donor will not recognize the accrued loss (referred to as “built-in
loss”) at the time of the gift, and, upon a subsequent sale of the property, the donee
will also not recognize that loss, assuming the value of the property remains
constant.8 Thus, taxpayers are prevented from shifting the tax consequences of an
existing built-in loss (a strategy that would save tax if the donee could deduct the
loss from income that was subject to a higher effective tax rate than the rate
applicable to income, if any, against which the donor could deduct the loss). In
summary, in the context of gifts, taxpayers can shift the tax consequences of an
existing built-in gain from one taxpayer to another but cannot transfer the tax
2
For discussion of this requirement that gain or loss is generally not realized until a
sale for cash or exchange for other consideration, see generally Jeffrey L. Kwall, When
Should Asset Appreciation Be Taxed?: The Case for a Disposition Standard of Realization,
86 IND. L.J. 77 (2011).
3
The taxpayer would include the gain in income unless a non-recognition provision
applied and assuming that the gain was not subject to exclusion from income under special
provisions, such as Section 121 (which excludes gain, up to certain dollar amounts, from sale
of a principal residence, in some cases).
4
Assuming a non-recognition provision does not apply, the taxpayer will recognize
loss, and the taxpayer’s ability to deduct the loss will depend on how the asset was held (as
Section 165 provides different rules for deductibility of loss depending on how the taxpayer
held the asset) and other factors, such as whether the sale occurred between related parties,
as discussed below. See infra Part II.A.
5
See infra Part I.A.
6
This assumes that the “kiddie tax” imposed by Section 1(g) of the Internal Revenue
Code would not apply to the gain recognized by the donee, because, for instance, the donee
does not meet the age requirements of Section 1(g)(2)(A). See I.R.C. § 1(g) (2012).
7
Because most gifts involve the transfer of capital assets and because the tax rates that
apply to net capital gain are not as steeply graduated as those that apply to ordinary income,
the ability to reduce tax liability through gifts is somewhat limited.
8
See infra Part I.A.
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consequences of an existing built-in loss. A similar dynamic is at play in the context
of the contribution of property to a partnership and the allocation of tax gain or loss
recognized upon a subsequent sale of the property, governed by Section 704(c).9
The current rules regarding gifts were adopted in the 1930s during the Great
Depression.10 At that time, the magnitude of accrued investment losses likely
dwarfed the amount of accrued investment gains. Thus, understandably, lawmakers
at that time likely perceived the ability to shift the tax consequences of built-in losses
from one taxpayer to another as representing a far more significant threat to the tax
base than the ability to shift the tax consequences of built-in gains. However, the
failure to address built-in gains at the same time (or since that time) seems shortsighted. In the recently enacted tax legislation, Congress once again did nothing to
address the ability to shift the tax consequences of built-in gains.
The provisions just described are not the only instances in which tax law treats
losses with greater caution than gains. However, in the case of many of the other
ways in which tax law provides stricter treatment to losses than gains, a legitimate
justification for the inconsistent treatment exists. Namely, greater potential for taxmotivated transactions involving losses can explain the decision to address losses
but not gains.11 Some of the parameters of these provisions are not perfectly designed
to achieve the goal of preventing tax-motivated transactions. Therefore, each may
warrant some revision, as discussed below. However, in general terms, the decision
to address losses but not gains in the context of these examples is a sensible one,
and, therefore, not an example of the phenomenon that this Article intends to
highlight. Examples of provisions that fall in this second category (in which the
varying treatment of losses and gains can be rationalized) include Section 267(a)(1)
and Section 362(e)(2). A detailed description of each of these provisions is deferred
until Part II below. For now, suffice it to say that, in the case of each of these
examples, harsher treatment is granted to losses than gains. However, this harsher
treatment can be explained by the fact that the provisions prevent tax savings from
transactions involving losses in situations in which parallel transactions involving
gains do not present the same threat to the tax base. This is true because either the
comparable transactions involving gains are already addressed by other provisions
or the parallel transactions involving gains would result in no tax savings (or, in
many cases, would result in increased tax liability).
At the outset, it is worth noting that inconsistent treatment of gains and losses
is not the only way in which tax law does not treat similar transactions in a parallel
fashion, and this Article does not contend that consistent treatment is always
required or even desirable. 12 Rather, this Article observes that inconsistent treatment
9

See infra Part I.B.
See infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text.
11
To be clear, this Article does not claim that tax-motivated transactions are always
undesirable or that tax motivation should always be relevant. Instead, this Article is taking
an interpretative approach—it assumes that lawmakers might have the goal of discouraging
tax-motivated transactions and it assesses whether or not the provisions serve that goal.
12
For discussion of other examples involving non-parallel treatment, see generally
Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal Principles of Parallelism and
10
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can sometimes be a signal that lawmakers have taken steps to deter some taxmotivated transactions while overlooking the potential for other, similar taxmotivated transactions. In the examples discussed in this Article, lawmakers took
action to prevent tax-motivated transactions involving losses without addressing
parallel transactions involving gains. In those instances, addressing the parallel
transactions involving gains may be desirable for the sake of preventing taxmotivated transactions; not out of a desire to achieve consistency for consistency’s
sake. In some of these instances, lawmakers could achieve the goal of preventing
tax-motivated transactions involving gains by adopting rules that were not parallel
to the rules applicable to losses. For instance, lawmakers might address taxmotivated gifts of built-in gain property by requiring the donor to recognize gain at
the time of the gift, while, at the same time, preventing deduction of losses in the
case of a gift of built-in loss property.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I will provide examples of provisions
that grant harsher treatment to losses than gains in circumstances in which the
inconsistent treatment is not founded upon any legitimate rationale. In order to
provide useful contrasting examples, Part II will discuss provisions that justifiably
treat losses more harshly than gains. Part III will explore rationales that might
explain handling losses with more caution than gains. In particular, it will consider
whether greater potential for tax-motivated transactions involving losses explains
the unequal treatment, and it will conclude that this concern does not explain the
unequal treatment in the case of the examples discussed in Part I but does explain
the unequal treatment in the case of the examples discussed in Part II (at least if
some of those provisions were modified to more accurately target tax-motivated
transactions). As a second potential explanation, Part III will consider whether the
unequal treatment of losses and gains is attributable to the difficulty of crafting an
acceptable, parallel provision that would address gains, and Part III will conclude
that this explanation might describe some of the examples but not all. Finally, Part
IV will conclude that, in the case of examples for which no explanation justifies
disparate treatment, the logical inference is that lawmakers ought to have also
addressed gains, and the failure to do so results from lawmakers crafting an overly
narrow response that addressed only the most recent, high profile gimmick in
engineering transactions to reduce tax liability.
I. EXAMPLES OF QUESTIONABLE INCONSISTENT TREATMENT
In some instances, current law treats losses more harshly than gains even
though the harsher treatment cannot be explained by greater potential for taxHorizontal Equity, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 645 (2006). See also Rodney P. Mock & Jeffrey Tolin,
What’s Mine is Mine: Taxing Pre-Contribution Gains, 29 AKRON TAX J. 105, 106 (2014)
(“Of course, from a policy perspective there is no blanket rule (or theory) in the Code, its
regulations, or tax literature that transaction-related tax items such as gains and losses must
achieve absolute parity in treatment.”).
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motivated transactions involving losses or, at least in some cases, by any legitimate
rationale. Examples of this phenomenon include Section 1015, which prevents a
donor from shifting a built-in loss to a donee but would allow the donor to shift a
built-in gain, and Section 704(c), which prevents the shifting of a built-in loss in
property contributed to a partnership from the contributing partner to other partners
but allows, in some fact patterns, the shifting of a built-in gain. Each of these
examples is discussed, in turn, below.
A. Basis in Property Received by Gift
In the context of gifts made during a donor’s lifetime, Section 1015(a) prevents
shifting the tax consequences of an existing built-in loss from the donor to the donee
for purposes of allowing the donee to realize a loss on later sale of the property, but
the same provision allows shifting the tax consequences of an existing built-in
gain.13 In order to demonstrate the existing rules, consider the following examples.
Example 1. Mother acquires stock for $50. As a result, Mother’s basis in the
stock is $50.14 Mother gives the stock to Daughter at a time when the stock is
worth $150. Mother does not realize gain as a result of the gift,15 and Daughter
does not include the value of the stock in income.16 Daughter’s basis in the
stock will be $50 (Mother’s basis in the stock).17 If Daughter sells the stock for
$150, Daughter realizes $100 of gain (so the tax consequences of the gain that
accrued while the stock was held by Mother have been shifted to Daughter).18
Example 2. Mother acquires stock for $50. As a result, Mother’s basis in the
stock is $50.19 Mother gives the stock to Daughter at a time when the stock is
worth $20. Mother does not realize loss as a result of the gift, and Daughter
does not include the value of the stock in income.20 Daughter’s basis in the
stock will be $20 (the fair market value at the time of the gift) for purposes of
13

Specifically, Section 1015(a) provides: “If the property was acquired by gift . . . the
basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the donor. . . except that if such
basis . . . is greater than the fair market value of the property at the time of the gift, then for
the purpose of determining loss the basis shall be such fair market value.” I.R.C. § 1015(a)
(2012).
14
See id. § 1012.
15
Although no clear realization requirement is contained in the Code, the closest thing
to statutory authority is I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (providing that gains derived from dealings in
property are included in gross income) combined with I.R.C. § 1001(a) (describing the
amount of gain realized).
16
See I.R.C. § 102(a) (2012).
17
See id. § 1015(a).
18
Her gain realized will be the excess of the $150 received on the sale over her $50
basis in the stock. Id. § 1001(a).
19
See id. § 1012.
20
See id. § 102(a).
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determining loss realized on a subsequent sale and $50 for purposes of
determining gain realized on a subsequent sale.21 If Daughter sells the stock for
$20, Daughter realizes no loss (because $20 is not less than her $20 basis for
purposes of determining loss) and no gain (because $20 is not more than her
$50 basis for purposes of determining gain).22 Thus, the $30 loss that accrued
while Mother held the stock cannot be shifted to Daughter.
To summarize the examples above, assume a donor acquires property that
increases in value in the donor’s hands. The donor will not realize the gain that had
accrued in the property at the time of the gift, and, therefore, the donor will not be
subject to tax on the increase in value that occurred while the donor held the
property. Assuming the property maintains its value, the donee will realize the builtin gain that accrued in the donor’s hands upon a subsequent sale of the property by
the donee. Thus, the donee (and not the donor) eventually will be subject to tax on
the gain that accrued while the donor held the property. As discussed in more detail
in Part III.A.1 below, if the donee’s effective tax rate is lower than that of the donor,
the overall effect of the current regime is to reduce the amount of tax imposed on
the gain. In Example 1 above, for instance, if Mother’s effective tax rate is 20% and
Daughter’s effective tax rate is 15%, the $100 gain that accrued in the stock will
result in $15 of tax ($100 times 15%) when Daughter sells the stock instead of the
$20 of tax ($100 times 20%) that would have been imposed if Mother had sold the
stock.23
By contrast, assume that property declines in value in the donor’s hands. The
donor will not realize the accumulated loss at the time of the gift, and, therefore, the
donor will not be allowed to potentially deduct a resulting tax loss so that the donor
will forgo potential tax savings. Assuming the property does not decline in value
further in the donee’s hands, the donee also will realize no loss upon a subsequent
sale of the property. Thus, no one, neither the donor nor the donee, will obtain any
tax deduction for the loss that accrued while the donor held the property. As
discussed in more detail in Part III.A.1 below, the current regime prevents the
potential tax savings that would result if the rules regarding losses were symmetrical
to the rules regarding gains. In particular, if the rules regarding losses mirrored the
rules regarding gains, then, upon a subsequent sale of the property, the donee would
realize the loss that accrued while the donor held the property, assuming the property
21

See id. § 1015(a).
If Daughter sold the stock for $60, Daughter would recognize a gain of $10 because
Daughter’s basis in the stock is $50 for purposes of determining a subsequent gain. See id.
Essentially the $40 increase in value that accrued in Daughter’s hands can be offset by the
$30 built-in loss that existed at the time of the gift.
23
Because most gifts involve the transfer of capital assets and because the tax rates that
apply to net capital gain are not as steeply graduated as those that apply to ordinary income,
the ability to reduce tax liability through gifts is somewhat limited. Furthermore, this
example assumes that the “kiddie tax” imposed by Section 1(g) of the Internal Revenue Code
would not apply to the gain recognized by Daughter, because, for instance, Daughter does
not meet the age requirements of Section 1(g)(2)(A).
22
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did not recover the lost value by the time of the subsequent sale. If the donee’s
effective tax rate were higher than that of the donor, the overall effect of this
alternative regime would be to increase the amount of tax savings resulting from the
loss. In Example 2 above, for instance, if Mother’s effective tax rate is 0% and
Daughter’s effective tax rate is 15%, the $30 loss that accrued in the stock would
result in $0 of tax savings ($30 times 0%) if Mother sold the stock, but, if the loss
could be shifted to Daughter, it would result in $4.50 of tax savings ($30 times 15%)
when Daughter sold the stock. Because the loss cannot be shifted to Daughter,
however, the loss results in no tax savings for either individual.
B. Subsequent Sale of Property Contributed to a Partnership
As discussed above in Part I.A, current law allows a donor to shift, to the donee,
the tax consequences of a built-in gain that has accrued in property while in the
donor’s hands. By contrast, current law does not allow a donor to shift the tax
consequences of a built-in loss to the donee. Similarly, when a taxpayer contributes
to a partnership property that has appreciated in value in the taxpayer’s hands, in
some circumstances, tax law allows the taxpayer to shift to the other partners the tax
consequences of a portion of the gain that accrued while the partner held the
property. By contrast, current law forbids similar shifting of the tax consequences
of an accrued loss. Demonstrating the varying rules requires some background
regarding the tax consequences of contributing property to a partnership and the
subsequent sale of the property by the partnership.
When a partner contributes property to a partnership, the partner and the
partnership generally do not recognize any gain or loss for tax purposes as a result
of the contribution.24 In order to demonstrate, consider the following example:
Example 3. An individual, A, owns a piece of land that A acquired some time
ago for $5,000. The value of the land has increased over time so that the land
is currently worth $15,000. A and B, another individual, form an entity that is
treated as a partnership for tax purposes. A contributes the land and B
contributes $15,000 cash to this newly formed AB partnership, each in
exchange for a 50% interest in the AB partnership.
Under the facts of Example 3, A will not be required to recognize (and possibly
pay tax on) the $10,000 built-in gain that exists in the land at the time of the
contribution.25 However, in order to ensure that the $10,000 built-in gain is
preserved to be potentially recognized at a future point in time, the AB partnership
will obtain a tax basis in the land equal to $5,000 (A’s basis in the land),26 and A
will obtain a tax basis in A’s interest in the partnership equal to $5,000 (A’s basis in

24

See I.R.C. § 721 (2012).
See id. § 721(a).
26
See id. § 723.
25
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the land).27 As a result, if A sold his or her interest in the partnership for $15,000
after the contribution, A would recognize $10,000 of tax gain, and if the AB
partnership sold the land for $15,000 after the contribution, the AB partnership
would recognize $10,000 of tax gain. Moreover, a partnership does not itself pay tax
at an entity level on income recognized by the partnership but, rather, allocates items
of taxable income, gain, loss and deduction among its partners so that its partners
will take such items into account for purposes of computing their taxable income.28
Consequently, this $10,000 of tax gain recognized by the partnership would be
allocated to the partners.29
Regarding how the $10,000 tax gain would be allocated, § 704(c)(1)(A)
provides:
“[I]ncome, gain, loss, and deduction with respect to property contributed
to the partnership by a partner shall be shared among the partners so as to
take account of the variation between the basis of the property to the
partnership and its fair market value at the time of the contribution.”30
In other words, under the facts of Example 3, if the AB partnership sells the land for
$15,000 so that the AB partnership recognizes $10,000 of tax gain, the $10,000 tax
gain must be allocated between A and B in a manner that takes into account the
difference between the basis of the land ($5,000) and the fair market value of the
land ($15,000) at the time A contributed the land to the partnership.31 Section
704(c)(1)(A) leaves to the Treasury Regulations the task of specifying how
allocations should take into account built-in gain or built-in loss that exists in
property at the time at which it is contributed to a partnership.32 The Treasury
Regulations under § 704(c) provide that allocations must be made using a
“reasonable method” that is consistent with the purpose of § 704(c). This purpose,
according to the Treasury Regulations, is to “prevent the shifting of tax
consequences among partners with respect to pre-contribution gain or loss.”33 The
27

See id. § 722.
Id. §§ 701–702.
29
Likewise, if the value of the land had declined in value over time prior to the
contribution so that, while A acquired the land for $25,000, the land was worth $15,000 at
the time of the contribution, A would not be allowed to recognize the $10,000 built-in loss
that existed in the land at the time of the contribution. See id. § 721. If A sold his or her
interest in the partnership for $15,000 after the contribution, A would recognize $10,000 of
tax loss. Id. § 722. If the AB partnership sold the land for $15,000 after the contribution, the
AB partnership would allocate $10,000 of tax loss to A. See id. § 704(c)(1)(C).
30
Id. § 704(c)(1)(A).
31
If, instead of land, a partner contributes depreciable property to a partnership, section
704(c) also governs the allocation of tax depreciation deductions with respect to the property
with the same goal of preventing a shift of tax consequences among partners with respect to
pre-contribution gain or loss. See id. § 704(c).
32
Id. § 704(c)(1)(A).
33
Treas. Reg. § 1.704–3(a)(1) (2017).
28
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Treasury Regulations describe three methods that are “generally reasonable.”34
These three methods are the “traditional method,” the “traditional method with
curative allocations,” and the “remedial allocation method.”35 The Treasury
Regulations do not require that partnerships use any particular method, and, in fact,
the Treasury Regulations provide that a partnership may use different methods with
respect to different items of contributed property as long as the “overall method or
combination of methods are reasonable based on the facts and circumstances and
consistent with the purpose of section 704(c).”36
1. Contribution of Appreciated Property
If a partner contributes property that has increased in value before contributing
it to a partnership and the property declines in value after the contribution, use of the
“traditional method” will result in shifting the tax consequences of, at least some of,
the built-in gain away from the contributing partner and to the other partners. By
contrast, use of the “remedial allocation method” would prevent shifting the tax
consequences to the other partners.37 Furthermore, in the case of depreciable
property, the method elected by the partnership can affect the allocation of
depreciation deductions even if the value of the property does not decline, and in
this area as well, the remedial method most consistently guarantees that tax
consequences will not be shifted from the contributing partner to a non-contributing
partner.38 In order to demonstrate the potential for gain-shifting, consider the
34

Id.
Id. §§ 1.704-3(a)(1)–(d)(1).
36
Id. § 1.704-3(a)(2). In addition, the Treasury Regulations contain an anti-abuse rule
that places some constraints on the flexibility afforded by the Regulations. Id. § 1.7043(a)(10). For further discussion of the anti-abuse rule, see Emily Cauble, Making
Partnerships Work for Mom and Pop and Everyone Else, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 247, 261–63
(2011).
37
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(1) (2017). Use of the “traditional method with curative
allocations” may or may not prevent shifting the tax consequences of the gain to the other
partners, depending on other items recognized by the partnership. Because discussion of this
method is not necessary to illustrate the observations made by this Article, further discussion
of it is omitted.
38
This can be illustrated with an example that is a simplified version of the facts of
Castle Harbour. TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir.
2006). Assume T and TE form an entity that is treated as a partnership for tax purposes. T is
subject to U.S. tax on income allocated to T from the partnership, but TE is not subject to
U.S. tax on income allocated to TE from the partnership. T contributes airplanes to the
partnership. The airplanes are depreciable. At the time of the contribution, the airplanes are
worth $1,000, but the airplanes have a tax basis of $100. Furthermore, the airplanes have a
remaining depreciation recovery period of one year. TE contributes $1 of cash to the
partnership. The partnership leases the airplanes to a third party and earns $1,000 of rental
income for one year. The partnership sells the airplanes for $0 and liquidates in year 10.
Assume the partnership agrees that, for purposes of determining the partners’ book capital
accounts that will measure the amount each partner is entitled to receive on liquidation of
35
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following example:
Example 3A. An individual, A, owns a piece of land that A acquired some time
ago for $5,000. The value of the land has increased over time so that the land
is currently worth $15,000. A and B, another individual, form an entity that is
treated as a partnership for tax purposes. A contributes the land and B
contributes $15,000 cash to this newly formed AB partnership, each in
exchange for a 50% interest in the AB partnership. As a result of the
contribution, A does not recognize any tax gain.39 Following the contribution,

the partnership, all book income and loss will be allocated 99% to TE and 1% to T. In year
1, the book items that are allocated 99% to TE and 1% to T consist of: (1) book depreciation
of $1,000 (measured as: $1,000 beginning book value of airplanes x ($100 tax
depreciation/$100 beginning tax basis of airplanes) per Treas. Reg. § 1.704–
1(b)(2)(iv)(g)(3)); and (2) $1,000 of rent received. Thus, on net $0 of book gain is allocated
99% ($0) to TE and 1% ($0) to T. Consequently, capital account balances of T and TE remain
$1,000 for T (T’s initial capital account balance since T contributed property worth $1,000)
and $1 for TE (TE’s initial capital account balance since TE contributed $1 of cash) at the
end of year 1. As a result, even though 99% of book items are allocated to TE, when the
partnership distributes the $1,001 of cash that it holds on liquidation, TE receives $1 and T
receives $1,000. Regarding the allocation of tax items in year 1, if the partnership uses the
traditional method for making § 704(c) allocations with respect to the airplanes (as the
taxpayer did in TIFD III-E, Inc.), the results will be as follows. First, because $1,000 of book
income attributable to rent received by the partnership is allocated 99% to TE and 1% to T,
$1,000 of taxable income recognized by the partnership as a result of rent received by the
partnership will be allocated 99% ($990) to TE and 1% ($10) to T. Second, because $1,000
of book depreciation is allocated $990 to TE and $10 to T, tax depreciation from the airplanes
would be allocated in the same manner if it was available. However, the only tax depreciation
available is $100, which is allocated in its entirety to TE to get as close as possible to
matching the allocation of book depreciation. Thus, in total, taxable income is allocated $890
to TE who is not subject to tax and $10 to T. If the partnership instead uses the remedial
method for making I.R.C. § 704(c) allocations with respect to the airplanes, for one thing,
book depreciation of the airplanes would be spread over a longer period of time per Treas.
Reg. § 1.704-3(d)(2). Also, the partnership would invent notional tax items of depreciation
to match book depreciation allocated to TE and equal, offsetting notional tax items of
operating income from the airplanes to allocate to T. For the sake of simplicity, if we focus
on the second modification made by the remedial method, then total tax items allocated in
year 1 would be: $0 to TE (which consists of $990 of rental income, $100 of actual tax
depreciation, and $890 of notional tax depreciation) and $900 to T (which consists of $10 of
actual rental income and $890 of notional operating income from the airplanes).
Consequently, T’s taxable income effectively equals $1000 of rental income minus $100 of
remaining tax depreciation on the airplanes, and no taxable income is shifted from T (who is
subject to tax) to TE (who is not subject to tax). If both modifications made by the remedial
method are applied, then even under the remedial method, some taxable income could be
shifted temporarily from T to TE, but the shift would be less drastic than what occurs under
the traditional method.
39
See I.R.C. § 721(a) (2012).
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the partnership’s basis in the land is $5,000,40 A’s basis in his or her interest in
the partnership is $5,000,41 and B’s basis in his or her interest in the partnership
is $15,000.42 One year after the partnership was formed, the AB partnership
sells the land for $10,000. Two years after selling the land, the AB partnership
distributes the cash that it holds ($25,000) equally to A and B ($12,500 each).
Under the facts of Example 3A, because the partnership’s basis in the land is
$5,000, the partnership recognizes $5,000 of tax gain upon sale of the land for
$10,000. If the partnership uses the traditional method for allocating items under §
704(c) with respect to the land, $5,000 of tax gain will be allocated to A and no tax
gain or loss will be allocated to B. In effect, use of the traditional method, under the
facts of Example 3A, results in a shift from A to B of $2,500 of the $10,000 tax gain
attributable to the increase in value of the land that occurred while it was owned by
A. Prior to A’s contribution of the land, the land increased in value by $10,000 (to
$15,000), and A benefited economically from that increase in value in its entirety
because A was able to exchange the land for a 50% interest in a partnership that held
assets worth $30,000. Subsequent to A’s contribution of the land to the AB
partnership, the value of the land declined by $5,000. Because A and B share the
economic benefits and burdens of the AB partnership equally, this decline in value
will be shared equally by A and B ($2,500 each), so that, for example, when the
partnership distributes the cash that it holds ($25,000) in liquidation, each of A and
B receive $12,500 ($2,500 less than the value that each contributed to the
partnership). Consequently, if A and B were each allocated taxable gain and loss in
an amount that matched economic gain and loss, A would be allocated $10,000 of
tax gain from sale of the land and $2,500 of tax loss from sale of the land (or $7,500
of tax gain from sale of the land on net), and B would be allocated $2,500 of tax loss
from sale of the land. However, because the only tax item recognized by the
partnership as a result of sale of the land is $5,000 of tax gain, $5,000 of tax gain is
allocated to A to get as close as possible to the result described above, while using
only tax items actually recognized by the partnership from sale of the land.43
Compared to what should have been allocated to the partners based on their
economic gain and loss, A is allocated $2,500 less tax gain than what A should have
been allocated, and B is allocated $2,500 less tax loss than what B should have been
allocated. In effect, $2,500 of tax gain has been inappropriately shifted from A to
B.44
40

See id. § 723.
See id. § 722.
42
See id.
43
Limiting the partnership to using tax items actually recognized from sale of the land
is called the “ceiling rule.” Abiding by the “ceiling rule” is the distinguishing feature of the
traditional method. See, e.g., Leigh Osofsky, Unwinding the Ceiling Rule, 34 VA. TAX. REV.
63, 64 (2014).
44
This shift occurs because the $5,000 tax gain recognized by the partnership is
effectively the net result of the $10,000 of gain that accrued prior to contribution of the land
and the $5,000 of loss that accrued after contribution of the land. Netting the two figures
41
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Moreover, while this shift may be temporary, it can, nevertheless, significantly
affect the tax consequences experienced by A and B. After the allocation of the
$5,000 tax gain from sale of the land to A, A’s basis in his or her interest in the
partnership will increase to $10,000,45 and B’s basis in his or her interest in the
partnership will remain $15,000. If the partnership distributes $12,500 cash to each
of A and B in liquidation of the partnership, A will recognize $2,500 of tax gain (the
excess of $12,500 cash over A’s $10,000 basis in his or her interest in the
partnership), and B will recognize $2,500 of tax loss (the excess of B’s $15,000 basis
in his or her interest in the partnership over $12,500).46 The $2,500 tax loss
recognized by B corresponds to the $2,500 tax loss from sale of the land that should
have been but was not allocated to B at the time of the sale of the land, as a result of
shifting $2,500 of tax gain from A to B. Likewise, the $2,500 tax gain recognized
by A corresponds to the $2,500 tax gain from sale of the land that should have been
allocated to A but was instead shifted from A to B. However, recognition of a $2,500
tax loss (or gain) on liquidation by B (or A) does not fully compensate for the earlier
shift in tax gain from A to B. For one thing, tax gain and loss from sale of the land
could be of a different character, with different resulting tax consequences, than tax
gain or loss recognized on liquidation. For another, the tax loss (or gain) on
liquidation may be recognized years later if substantial time elapses between sale of
the land and liquidation of the partnership.47
Unlike the traditional method, the remedial method does not rely on tax gain or
loss recognized on liquidation of the partnership to potentially correct for an earlier
shift in tax consequences attributable to a pre-contribution change in asset value.
Rather, under the remedial method, the partnership invents purely fictional tax items
of precisely the right amount and the right character to ensure that any shift in tax
consequences attributable to a pre-contribution change in asset value is completely
offset at the exact time that it would otherwise occur.
In order to illustrate the operation of the remedial method, we return to the facts
of Example 3A set forth above. In that example, when the partnership sells the land
for $10,000, on net, A has realized $7,500 of economic gain with respect to the land.
This $7,500 net economic gain can be separated into two components: (1) $10,000
of economic gain that accrued between the time A acquired the land for $5,000 and
the time A exchanged the land for a 50% interest in a partnership that held assets
worth $30,000 and (2) A’s 50% share of the $5,000 of economic loss that accrued
between the time A contributed the land and the time the partnership sold the land.
In total, B has realized $2,500 of economic loss with respect to the land, which
represents B’s 50% share of the $5,000 economic loss that accrued after the land
was contributed to the partnership. Therefore, if A and B were allocated tax gain and
results in $2,500 of the tax gain attributable to the pre-contribution increase in value of the
land that economically benefited A offsetting the portion of the tax loss attributable to the
post-contribution decline in value of the land that economically burdened B.
45
See I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(A) (2012).
46
See id. § 731(a).
47
For discussion of additional ways in which unwinding the shift of tax consequences
could be delayed or prevented, see Osofsky, supra note 43.
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loss in connection with a sale of the land in an amount that precisely matched
economic gain and loss realized by each partner, A would be allocated $7,500 of tax
gain and B would be allocated $2,500 of tax loss. However, under the traditional
method, the partnership allocates $5,000 of tax gain to A because that is the only tax
item actually recognized by the partnership. Thus, under this method, A is allocated
$2,500 less tax gain than what should be allocated to A, and B is allocated $2,500
less tax loss than what should be allocated to B because $2,500 of tax gain has
effectively been shifted from A to B. Under the remedial method, on the other hand,
the partnership invents a fictional item (which is treated in the same manner as an
actual item) of $2,500 of tax loss from sale of the land and an equal and offsetting
fictional item (which, again, is treated in the same manner as an actual item) of
$2,500 of tax gain from sale of the land. In addition to allocating $5,000 of actual
tax gain to A, the partnership allocates the $2,500 of fictional tax gain to A, so that
A recognizes, in total, $7,500 of tax gain—an amount that precisely matches
economic gain realized by A. Likewise, the partnership allocates the fictional item
of $2,500 of tax loss to B, which precisely matches economic loss realized by B. As
a result, the partnership shifts no tax gain from A to B. Furthermore, because the
partnership has allocated tax items to A and B in an amount that matches economic
gain and loss realized and the partnership has not shifted any tax gain from one
partner to the other, A and B will not recognize any further tax gain or loss when
they each receive $12,500 of cash on liquidation. In particular, after the partnership
allocates: (i) $7,500 of tax gain from sale of the land to A and (ii) $2,500 of tax loss
from sale of the land to B, A’s basis in his or her interest in the partnership will
increase to $12,500,48 and B’s basis in his or her interest in the partnership will
decrease to $12,500.49 Therefore, when the partnership distributes $25,000 of cash
equally to A and B on liquidation ($12,500 each), A and B will not recognize gain
or loss as a result of the liquidation.50
2. Contribution of Depreciated Property
As illustrated above, when a partner contributes property with a built-in gain to
a partnership and the property subsequently declines in value, the tax consequences
of the built-in gain may be shifted from the contributing partner to other partners, at
least temporarily. Such a shift occurs when the partnership uses the “traditional
method” under Section 704(c) but is prevented if the partnership uses the “remedial
method.” By contrast, if a partner contributes property with a built-in loss to a
partnership, Section 704(c)(1)(C) prevents shifting the loss from the contributing
partner to other partners, regardless of the method used by the partnership under
Section 704(c). In order to demonstrate, consider the following example.

48

See I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(A) (2012).
See id. § 705(a)(2)(A).
50
See id. § 731(a).
49
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Example 4. Assume two individuals, A and B, form a partnership. A
contributes land with a basis of $200 and a fair market value of $150 to the
partnership in exchange for a 50% interest in the partnership. B contributes
$150 cash to the partnership in exchange for a 50% interest in the partnership.
As a result of the contribution, A does not recognize any tax loss.51 One year
after the partnership was formed, the AB partnership sells the land for $200.
Two years after selling the land, the AB partnership distributes the cash that it
holds ($350) equally to A and B ($175 each).
If it were not for Section 704(c)(1)(C), use of the traditional method would have
the effect of shifting some of the built-in loss from A to B, and use of the remedial
method would prevent any such shifting. Because of Section 704(c)(1)(C), no
transfer of the built-in loss will occur regardless of the method used.
In particular, absent Section 704(c)(1)(C) and assuming the partnership used
the traditional method, the results would be as follows. When the partnership sold
the land for $200, the partnership would recognize $0 of tax gain or loss given that
the partnership’s basis in the land would be $200 (A’s basis in the land). B would
have experienced a $25 economic gain (B’s 50% share of the $50 increase in the
value of the land that occurred after the partnership was formed), and, therefore, B
should be allocated $25 of tax gain. However, B would be allocated no tax gain
because the partnership would recognize no tax gain. A would have experienced a
$25 economic loss (the $50 loss that accrued as the land declined in value prior to A
contributing it to the partnership netted against A’s 50% share of the $50 increase in
the value of the land that occurred after the partnership was formed). Therefore, A
should be allocated $25 tax loss, but A would be allocated no tax loss because the
partnership recognizes none. Thus, at the time of sale, A would be allocated $25 too
little tax loss and B would be allocated $25 too little tax gain because, in effect, $25
of tax loss would have been shifted from A to B.52
Even without Section 704(c)(1)(C), if the partnership used the remedial
method, no transfer of the tax consequences of the built-in loss would occur. In
particular, upon sale of the land, if the partnership recognized no actual tax gain or
loss, the partnership would invent $25 of tax gain to allocate to B (to match B’s $25
economic gain), and the partnership would invent an equal, offsetting $25 of tax loss
to allocate to A (to match A’s $25 economic loss).53
51

See id. § 721(a).
Under the facts above, upon liquidation, A would recognize a $25 tax loss and B
would recognize a $25 tax gain to compensate, to some degree, for the earlier shift in tax
loss. This occurs because A’s basis in his or her partnership interest would be $200 so the
receipt of a $175 cash liquidating distribution results in A recognizing a $25 loss, and B’s
basis in his or her partnership interest would be $150 so the receipt of a $175 cash liquidating
distribution results in B recognizing a $25 gain. See I.R.C. §§ 705, 731(a) (2012). For
discussion regarding why this later adjustment does not fully compensate for the earlier shift
in tax consequences, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
53
Furthermore, under these facts, A and B would recognize no tax gain or loss on
52
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The adoption of Section 704(c)(1)(C) prevents the partnership from transferring
the tax consequences of the existing built-in loss from A to B even if the partnership
uses the traditional method. In particular, as clarified by Treasury Regulations
proposed in 2014,54 under the facts of Example 4, the partnership will be treated as
having a basis in the land of $150 (the fair market value of the land at the time of
the contribution), and A (the contributing partner) will be entitled to a $50 “basis
adjustment” with respect to the land (where $50 is the amount of the built-in loss
that existed in the land at the time of the contribution). When the partnership sold
the land for $200, the partnership would recognize $50 of tax gain ($200 minus the
partnership’s $150 tax basis), and the partnership would allocate the tax gain equally
to each partner ($25 each), consistently with how the partners share the
corresponding economic gain. In determining the amount that is allocated to A (the
contributing partner), however, the partnership would factor in A’s $50 basis
adjustment which has the effect of transforming A’s $25 gain into a $25 loss ($25
minus $50). The basis adjustment has no effect on the gain allocated to B. Thus,
when the dust settles, the partnership allocates $25 tax loss to A and $25 tax gain to
B, amounts which precisely match each partner’s economic gain or loss. As a result,
none of the existing built-in loss is shifted from A to B.55
3. Summary
In summary, when a taxpayer contributes to a partnership property that has
appreciated in value in the taxpayer’s hands, in some circumstances, tax law allows
the taxpayer to shift to the other partners the tax consequences of a portion of the
gain that accrued while the partner held the property. By contrast, current law forbids
similar shifting of the tax consequences of an accrued loss. This pattern closely
resembles what occurs in the context of gifts because, in that context as well, tax law
allows for the tax consequences of a built-in gain to be shifted from a donor to a
liquidation. A’s basis in his or her partnership interest would be $175 ($200 minus $25 tax
loss allocation) so the receipt of a $175 cash liquidating distribution results in A recognizing
no tax gain or loss, and B’s basis in his or her partnership interest would be $175 ($150 plus
$25 tax gain allocation) so the receipt of a $175 cash liquidating distribution results in B
recognizing no tax gain or loss. See I.R.C. §§ 705, 731(a) (2012).
54
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704–3(f), 79 Fed. Reg. 3042 (Jan. 16, 2014). Prior to the
adoption of the proposed regulations, there was some confusion regarding how Section
704(c)(1)(C) would operate, and the proposed regulation does not necessarily dispel all of
the uncertainty. For further discussion, see Osofsky, supra note 43, at 104–105; Andrea
Monroe, Saving Subchapter K: Substance, Shattered Ceilings, and the Problem of
Contributed Property, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1419–20 (2009).
55
Furthermore, under these facts, A and B would recognize no tax gain or loss on
liquidation. This occurs because A’s basis in his or her partnership interest would be $175
so the receipt of a $175 cash liquidating distribution results in A recognizing no tax gain or
loss, and B’s basis in his or her partnership interest would be $175 so the receipt of a $175
cash liquidating distribution results in B recognizing no tax gain or loss. See I.R.C. §§ 705,
731(a) (2012).
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donee but restricts the ability to transfer the tax consequences of a built-in loss. As
will be explored below in Part III, the varying treatment of gains and losses in the
context of these examples is difficult to rationalize in any satisfactory way.
However, there are examples of ways in which tax law treats gains and losses
asymmetrically that do not defy logical explanation. Part II below will turn to a
discussion of examples that fall in this latter category.
II. EXAMPLES OF JUSTIFIABLY INCONSISTENT TREATMENT
As Part I above discussed, for both gifts of property and contributions of
property to a partnership, tax law allows the tax consequences of an existing builtin gain to be shifted from one taxpayer to another taxpayer but prohibits a similar
transfer of the tax consequences of an existing built-in loss. As will be described
below in Part III, in the context of gifts and contributions of property to a partnership,
the harsher treatment allotted to built-in losses cannot be justified based upon a
greater potential for tax-motivated transactions involving losses than gains.
However, in other instances, greater potential for tax-motivated transactions
involving losses can explain provisions that address losses but not gains. Some of
the parameters of these provisions are not perfectly designed to achieve the goal of
preventing tax-motivated transactions. Therefore, each may warrant some revision,
as discussed below in Parts III.A.3 and III.A.4. However, in general terms, the
decision to address losses but not gains in the context of these examples is a sensible
one. Examples of provisions that fall in this second category (in which the varying
treatment of losses and gains can be rationalized) include Section 267(a)(1) and
Section 362(e)(2), each of which is discussed, in turn, below.
A. Sale to a Related Party
Like the examples discussed above in Part I, Section 267(a)(1) treats losses
differently from gains. In particular, Section 267(a)(1) disallows the deduction of
losses recognized on sale of property between certain related parties.56 If such a sale
resulted in recognition of gain, however, the resulting gain generally would be
included in income. In order to demonstrate, consider the following examples.
Example 5. Mother acquires stock for $50. As a result, Mother’s basis in the
stock is $50.57 Mother sells the stock to Daughter for $20 at a time when the
stock is worth $20. Mother recognizes $30 of loss from the sale, but Mother
cannot deduct the $30 loss.58 Daughter’s basis in the stock will be $20 (cost
56

Id. § 267(a)(1) (“No deduction shall be allowed in respect of any loss from the sale
or exchange of property, directly or indirectly, between persons specified in any of the
paragraphs of subsection (b).”). Related parties include not only family members but also
various related entities, as well as individuals and entities in which individuals own sufficient
interests. Id. §§ 267(b)–(c).
57
See id. § 1012.
58
See id. § 267(a)(1).
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basis). If Daughter sells the stock for $20, Daughter recognizes no loss (because
$20 is not less than her $20 basis). Thus, the $30 loss that accrued while Mother
held the stock cannot be recognized by Mother and is never recognized because
Daughter takes a cost basis in the stock.59
Example 6. Mother acquires stock for $50. As a result, Mother’s basis in the
stock is $50.60 Mother sells the stock to Daughter for $150 at a time when the
stock is worth $150. Mother recognizes and includes in income $100 of gain as
a result of the sale.61 Daughter’s basis in the stock will be $150 (cost basis).62
Thus, the $100 gain that accrued while Mother held the stock is recognized by
Mother and included in her income at the time of the sale.
Thus, current law grants harsher treatment to losses than gains in transactions
involving the sale of property between related taxpayers. Any resulting losses cannot
be deducted, while any resulting gains generally are included in income.
B. Section 362(e)(2)
When a shareholder, or group of shareholders, contributes property to a
corporation in exchange for stock, the shareholder(s) will not recognize the gain or
loss built into the property as long as the contributing shareholder(s) own(s) a
controlling interest in the corporation immediately after the contribution.63 To ensure
that any built-in gain or loss that is not recognized at the time of the contribution is,
instead, recognized at the time of a future transaction, the built-in gain or loss will
be preserved.
In order to demonstrate, consider the facts of the following example.
Example 7. Assume an individual acquires a parcel of land for $100. Over
time, the value of the land decreases to $75. The individual contributes the land
to a newly formed corporation in exchange for all of the corporation’s stock.
The individual will not recognize any tax loss as a result of this exchange.64
Under law that existed prior to 2004, under the facts of Example 7, the
individual’s basis in the stock received would be $100 (the same as the individual’s

59

If Daughter sold the stock for $60, Daughter would recognize a gain of $10, because
Daughter can offset the $40 gain recognized ($60 minus $20 basis) by the $30 loss that
Mother recognized and could not deduct. See id. § 267(d)(1)(B). The resulting treatment, in
effect, parallels the treatment that follows from a gift of property with a built-in loss. See
supra note 22.
60
I.R.C. § 1012 (2012).
61
See id. § 1001.
62
See id. § 1012.
63
Id. § 351.
64
See id. § 351(a).
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basis in the land),65 and the corporation’s basis in the land would be $100 (the same
as the individual’s basis in the land).66 Thus, if the individual were to sell the stock
for $75, the individual would recognize a $25 tax loss. Likewise, if the corporation
sold the land for $75, the corporation would recognize a $25 tax loss. Therefore, the
individual would have incurred one $25 economic loss (having acquired land that
decreased in value by $25), but, rather than sell the land directly and recognize only
one $25 tax loss, the individual could create two $25 tax losses—one to be
recognized by the individual and one to be recognized by the corporation.
In 2004, Congress enacted legislation to combat the prospect of an individual
contributing built-in loss property to a corporation in order to extract two tax losses
from one economic loss.67 Under rules in effect since 2004, the built-in loss may be
preserved at only one level.68 However, taxpayers can decide whether to preserve
the loss at the shareholder level or at the corporate level.69 In particular, if no election
is filed, the built-in loss will be preserved at the shareholder level only.70 Thus, in
Example 7 above, the individual’s basis in the stock would be $100 (preserving a
$25 built-in loss in the stock), but the corporation’s basis in the land would be $75
(preserving no built-in loss in the land). However, if the individual and the
corporation both make an election under Section 362(e)(2)(C), the built-in loss will
be preserved at the corporate level only.71 In the example above, if such an election
were made, the individual’s basis in the stock would be $75 (preserving no built-in
loss in the stock), but the corporation’s basis in the land would be $100 (preserving
a $25 built-in loss in the land).
As just described, if built-in loss property is contributed to a corporation in a
transaction in which the loss is not recognized at the time of the contribution, the
loss will be preserved only once (either in the stock held by the shareholder or in the
asset held by the corporation). This treatment prevents the duplication (for tax
purposes) of an existing economic loss. By contrast, if built-in gain property is
contributed to a corporation in a transaction in which the gain is not recognized, the
gain is duplicated for tax purposes. It will be preserved in the stock held by the
shareholder and in the asset held by the corporation. In order to demonstrate,
consider the following example.

65

See id. § 358(a)(1).
See id. § 362(a).
67
For additional discussion, see Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Prevention of
Double Deductions of a Single Loss: Solutions in Search of a Problem, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1
(2006).
68
I.R.C. § 362(e)(2) (2012).
69
Id. § 362(e)(2).
70
Id. § 362(e)(2)(A).
71
Id. § 362(e)(2)(C).
66
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Example 8. Assume an individual acquires a parcel of land for $50. Over time,
the value of the land increases to $75. The individual contributes the land to a
newly formed corporation in exchange for all of the corporation’s stock. The
individual will not recognize any tax gain as a result of this exchange.72
Under the facts of Example 8, the individual’s basis in the stock received is $50
(the same as the individual’s basis in the land),73 and the corporation’s basis in the
land is $50 (the same as the individual’s basis in the land).74 Thus, if the individual
were to sell the stock for $75, the individual would recognize a $25 tax gain.
Likewise, if the corporation sold the land for $75, the corporation would recognize
a $25 tax gain. Therefore, the individual would have benefited from only one $25
economic gain (having acquired land that increased in value by $25), but, rather than
sell the land directly and recognize only one $25 tax gain, the contribution creates
two tax gains in the future. One $25 tax gain will be recognized by the individual
and one $25 tax gain will be recognized by the corporation.
In summary, when property with a built-in loss is contributed to a corporation
in a transaction in which the loss is not recognized, the loss will be preserved at only
one level—either in the contributing shareholder’s basis in the stock or in the
corporation’s basis in the asset, but not in both. This result prevents potential
duplication of tax losses. By contrast, when property with a built-in gain is
contributed to a corporation in a transaction in which the gain is not recognized, the
gain will be preserved at two levels—both in the shareholder’s basis in the stock and
in the corporation’s basis in the asset. Thus, while tax losses are not duplicated, tax
gains are.
III. POTENTIAL RATIONALES
As evidenced by the provisions discussed in Parts I and II, examples of ways
in which tax law administers stricter treatment to losses than gains are plentiful.75
72

See id. § 351(a).
See id. § 358(a)(1).
74
See id. § 362(a).
75
The examples discussed above in Parts I and II, although numerous, do not constitute
the entire universe of provisions that grant harsher tax treatment to losses than gains. Other
examples include: (1) the tax treatment of non-liquidating property distributions by
corporations (I.R.C. § 311 provides that a corporation generally will recognize gain when it
distributes appreciated property but will not recognize loss when it distributes depreciated
property); (2) the tax treatment of liquidating distributions by corporations (I.R.C. § 336
provides that, except for liquidations governed by Section 337, a corporation generally will
recognize gain or loss when it distributes appreciated or depreciated property in a liquidating
distribution, but I.R.C. § 336(d) describes circumstances in which loss will not be
recognized); (3) in the partnership context, mandatory basis adjustments are required to
prevent potential duplication of large tax losses, but gain duplication is allowed unless the
taxpayer opts otherwise, per I.R.C. §§ 734, 743, and 754; (4) I.R.C. § 737 requires partners
73
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This Part III will explore whether any legitimate rationale justifies the more severe
approach to losses. It will first consider whether a greater potential for tax-motivated
transactions involving losses offers a suitable explanation.76 As discussed below,
this rationale does not justify the varying treatment of losses and gains following
from the provisions discussed in Part I, but it could satisfactorily explain the
contrasting treatment of losses and gains afforded by the provisions discussed in Part
II (granting that the provisions discussed in Part II could, in many cases, benefit
from better design to more accurately achieve this goal).
As a second potential justification for the provisions that are not explained by
the goal of preventing tax-motivated transactions, this Part III will consider whether
the difficulty of crafting a parallel provision to address tax-motivated transactions
involving gains accounts for the inconsistent treatment of losses and gains. As
discussed below, this possibility might, to some degree, shed light on the
discrepancy between the treatment of gifts of property with built-in gains and the
treatment of gifts of property with built-in losses. However, it leaves unexplained
the inconsistent treatment that arises in the context of property contributed to a
partnership.
A. Greater Potential for Tax-Motivated Transactions
In some cases, lawmakers might craft more draconian rules for transactions
involving losses than those involving gains if the former are more likely to be taxmotivated. This part will discuss whether this possibility explains the varying
treatment of losses and gains in the context of each of the provisions described in
Parts I and II above, evaluating each provision, in turn.

to recognize gain on certain property distributions; (5) I.R.C. § 362(e)(1) prevents shifting
built-in tax losses from certain shareholders to a corporation, generally in situations in which
the shareholders would not be able to deduct the loss for U.S. tax purposes; (6) I.R.C. §
707(b) prevents the deduction of losses recognized on sales between certain related
partnerships and between partnerships and certain of their partners; and (7) the wash sale
rules contained in I.R.C. § 1091 prevent the deduction of losses recognized on certain sales
of stocks or securities when the taxpayer reacquires an interest in the stock within a certain
time period or in other circumstances. Furthermore, inconsistent treatment of gains and
losses is not the only way in which tax law does not treat similar transactions in a parallel
fashion. For discussion of other examples involving non-parallel treatment, see Kahn, supra
note 12. See also Mock & Tolin, supra note 12, at 106 (“Of course, from a policy perspective
there is no blanket rule (or theory) in the Code, its regulations, or tax literature that
transaction-related tax items such as gains and losses must achieve absolute parity in
treatment.”).
76
To be clear, this Article does not claim that tax-motivated transactions are always
undesirable or that tax motivation should always be relevant. Instead, this Article is taking
an interpretative approach – it assumes that lawmakers might have the goal of discouraging
tax-motivated transactions and it assesses whether or not the provisions serve that goal.
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1. Basis in Property Received by Gift
As discussed above in Part I.A, in the context of gifts made during a donor’s
lifetime, Section 1015(a) prevents shifting the tax consequences of an existing builtin loss from the donor to the donee for purposes of allowing the donee to realize a
loss on later sale of the property, but the same provision allows shifting the tax
consequences of an existing built-in gain. Absent the special rules governing builtin loss property, taxpayers might arrange gifts of built-in loss property with the goal
of reducing aggregate tax liability. However, it is equally true that taxpayers can,
even under the current rules, arrange gifts of built-in gain property with the goal of
reducing the tax imposed on the gain.
To illustrate the potential for tax-motivated transactions involving losses that
would exist if the rules regarding losses were consistent with the rules regarding
gains, consider the following example.
Example 9. Mother acquires stock for $50. As a result, Mother’s basis in the
stock is $50.77 Over time, the stock decreases in value to $20. Assume that, if
Mother were to sell the stock and recognize a $30 loss, Mother would not save
any taxes immediately as a result of the loss because Mother has earned no
income from which she could deduct the loss. Assume Daughter could deduct
a $30 loss from income that would otherwise be subject to a tax rate of 15%.
Given the facts of Example 9, if the rules regarding gifts of property with builtin losses were consistent with the rules regarding gifts of property with built-in
gains, Mother could give the stock to Daughter and Daughter could sell the stock,
resulting in Daughter recognizing a loss from sale of the stock of $30, saving $4.50
in tax liability. By contrast, if Mother sold the stock rather than Daughter, Mother
would recognize the $30 loss and save no tax liability. Provided that Mother wishes
to transfer $20 of value to Daughter (or is at least not resistant to the notion of doing
so), the parties might engage in this transaction merely to increase the amount of tax
savings resulting from the stock’s decline in value.
Under the law as currently in effect, however, Mother cannot shift the existing
built-in loss to Daughter. If Mother sells the stock for $20, Mother would recognize
$30 of loss and save no tax liability. If Mother gives the stock to Daughter, instead
of the Daughter taking a basis in the stock of $50 (Mother’s basis) for all purposes,
Daughter’s basis in the stock will be $20 (fair market value at the time of the gift)
for purposes of measuring loss on a subsequent sale. Therefore, when Daughter sells
the stock for $20, Daughter will recognize no loss and save no tax liability.78 As a
77

See I.R.C. § 351 (2012).
Because of the current tax treatment of gifts of built-in loss property, well-advised
taxpayers likely do not transfer built-in loss property by gift. However, if the tax treatment
were changed so that losses could be shifted to related taxpayers, well-advised taxpayers
might very well engage in such transactions.
78
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result, the parties can no longer arrange for a gift of the stock in order to increase the
amount of tax savings reaped from the stock’s fall in value.
To illustrate the potential for tax-motivated transactions involving gains that
exists even under current law, consider the following example.
Example 10. Mother acquires stock for $50. As a result, Mother’s basis in the
stock is $50.79 Over time, the stock increases in value to $150. Assume that, if
Mother were to sell the stock and recognize a $100 gain, Mother would incur
tax liability of $20 because Mother’s effective tax rate is 20%. Assume
Daughter’s effective tax rate on gain from sale of the stock would be 15%.
Given the facts of Example 10 and given the law that actually exists, Mother
could give the stock to Daughter and Daughter could sell the stock, resulting in
Daughter recognizing a gain from sale of the stock of $100, yielding $15 tax
liability.80 By contrast, if Mother sold the stock rather than Daughter, Mother would
recognize the $100 gain and incur tax liability of $20. Provided that Mother wishes
to transfer $150 of value to Daughter (or is at least not resistant to the notion of doing
so), the parties might engage in this transaction merely to decrease the amount of
tax liability resulting from the stock’s appreciation.
Thus, properties with built-in gains present as much of an opportunity for taxmotivated gifts as properties with built-in losses, and current law, while it addresses
the latter possibility, does nothing to prevent the former. This discrepancy is
puzzling, particularly given that the potential for tax-motivated gifts involving builtin gains may be even more significant than the parallel possibility involving built-in
losses. As Professors Schmalbeck and Zelenak observe in their Federal Income
Taxation case book:

79

See I.R.C. § 1012 (2012).
Because most gifts involve the transfer of capital assets and because the tax rates that
apply to net capital gain are not as steeply graduated as those that apply to ordinary income,
the ability to reduce tax liability through gifts is somewhat limited. Furthermore, this
example assumes that the “kiddie tax” imposed by § 1(g) of the Internal Revenue Code would
not apply to the gain recognized by Daughter, because, for instance, Daughter does not meet
the age requirements of Section 1(g)(2)(A). Id. § 1(g).
80
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Apparently, Congress is concerned that, in the absence of a special rule for
gifts of property with built-in losses, a low-income donor could make a
gift of loss property to a high income donee, who could then sell the
property and deduct the loss against income taxed in the donee’s higher
tax bracket. If that is the concern, though, Congress seems to be straining
at the proverbial gnat while swallowing the proverbial camel. Surely more
tax is avoided by the transferring of gains to lower bracket donees than
would ever be avoided by the transferring of losses to higher bracket
donees—both because investment gains are more common than
investment losses and because the natural direction of gifts is from higher
bracket to lower bracket taxpayers. Yet Congress blesses the more serious
tax avoidance technique while clamping down on the less serious one.81
As a last-ditch effort to finding redeeming logic in current law, one might
suppose that Congress envisioned a world in which taxpayers, at the time of initial
acquisition of an asset, would plan for resulting tax consequences upon eventual sale
and would use that planning as a guide for determining who would acquire the asset.
Furthermore, at the outset taxpayers would presumably assume that the investment
asset would increase in value (rather than decrease) or they would not acquire it in
the first place. Based on this prediction, taxpayers might arrange for the taxpayer
who was likely to be subject to a lower rate of tax to hold the asset from the outset,
so that gifts to shift built-in gains would be unnecessary if predictions about effective
tax rate proved to be true, and gifts of built-in loss property would be the greater
threat (if built-in losses could be shifted).
In other words, economic gains are expected, but economic losses are
unexpected. For tax planning purposes, family members, therefore, would arrange
their transactions, to the extent possible, so that the family member who is subject
to a lower effective tax rate acquires the asset originally. When the asset, contrary
to their expectations, accrues a loss, the person who acquired it might gift the asset
to the family member who is subject to a higher effective tax rate, if doing so would
shift the built-in loss to that family member.
For example, Mother and Daughter plan to buy stock. They expect the stock
will increase in value, so Daughter, who is subject to a lower effective tax rate,
acquires the stock. As it turns out, the stock falls in value, so Daughter would like
to shift the loss to Mother. Hence, the tax-motivated transaction under this fact
pattern would involve shifting losses rather than gains.

81

RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 297–
98 (3d ed. 2011). As discussed below in Part IV, one answer to this mystery may be that the
rules regarding basis in gifts of property with a built-in loss were enacted during the Great
Depression at a time when investment losses were much more prevalent than investment
gains. Thus, at the time of enactment, at least, Congress was addressing the camel rather than
the gnat.
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The problem with this account of the inconsistent treatment is that taxmotivated transactions involving gains can occur even when those gains are
expected if the parties did not accurately predict the individuals’ effective tax rates.82
For example, Mother and Daughter plan to buy stock. They expect the stock will
increase in value, so Daughter, who is subject to a lower effective tax rate, acquires
the stock. They are correct about their prediction for the stock (it does increase in
value). However, contrary to their expectations, Daughter’s effective tax rate is
higher than Mother’s (perhaps because Mother has recognized unexpected losses
from another source). Therefore, the parties engage in a tax-motivated transaction to
shift the built-in gain in the stock to Mother, and current law does not prevent them
from doing so.
Because gifts involving built-in gain property can be tax-motivated to the same
extent, or a greater extent, than gifts involving built-in loss property, lawmakers
concerned with tax-motivated gifts ought to address the possibility in the gain
context as well as the loss context. For administrative reasons and other reasons,
measures adopted to prevent tax-motivated gifts of built- in gain property might not
be parallel to provisions adopted to prevent tax-motivated gifts of built-in loss
property. For instance, as discussed in more detail below in Part III.B, lawmakers
might address tax-motivated gifts of built-in gain property by requiring the donor to
recognize gain at the time of the gift while at the same time preventing deduction of
losses in the case of a gift of built-in loss property.
2. Subsequent Sale of Property Contributed to a Partnership
As described above in Part I.B, when a taxpayer contributes to a partnership
property that has appreciated in value in the taxpayer’s hands, in some
circumstances, tax law allows the taxpayer to shift to the other partners the tax
consequences of a portion of the gain that accrued while the partner held the
property. By contrast, current law forbids similar shifting of the tax consequences
of an accrued loss. This asymmetrical treatment of gains and losses cannot be
explained by the existence of greater potential for tax-motivated transactions
involving built-in loss property than built-in gain property. Just as partners could
reap benefits by shifting the tax consequences of a built-in loss from a low-tax-rate
partner to a high-tax-rate partner, so too could they attain aggregate tax savings by
shifting the tax consequences of a built-in gain in the opposite direction. In fact, at
least one high profile transaction undertaken by sophisticated parties involved
shifting the tax consequences between partners of income from contributed property
rather than loss.83

82

Such transactions could also occur if the taxpayers did not, at the outset, plan for the
lower tax bracket family member to acquire the stock.
83
See supra note 38.
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3. Sale to a Related Party
As described above in Part II.A, current law grants harsher treatment to losses
than gains in transactions involving the sale of property between related taxpayers.
Any resulting losses cannot be deducted at the time of the sale, while any resulting
gains generally are included in income at the time of the sale. This asymmetry can
be explained by greater potential for manipulation in the case of losses.
In particular, if the asset is sold at a price equal to its fair market value, taxmotivated transactions generally will involve losses and not gains. If an asset is sold
at an amount differing from fair market value, tax-motivated transactions between
related parties could involve either losses or gains, but in such a transaction, the IRS
has available other mechanisms to address the potential abuse in some cases. In other
cases, the failure to address the potential abuse involving gains is simply an artifact
of the failure to address the potential abuse involving gains in the context of gifts.
First, consider the possibility for tax-motivated transactions that involve a sale
at a price that is equivalent to fair market value. If a taxpayer holds an asset that has
increased (or decreased) in value, generally, the taxpayer will not realize the
resulting gain (or loss) for tax purposes until the taxpayer sells the asset for cash or
exchanges it for other consideration. If and when the taxpayer does sell or exchange
the asset, the taxpayer will realize the resulting gain (or loss). At that time, in the
case of gain, generally the taxpayer includes the resulting gain in income, subjecting
the gain to tax at the taxpayer’s effective tax rate, and, in the case of loss, the
taxpayer may be entitled to deduct the loss (saving tax at the taxpayer’s effective tax
rate).
In the case of a loss, generally, a taxpayer would prefer to recognize the loss as
soon as possible, so that the taxpayer can benefit from tax savings in the earliest
possible year. By contrast, a taxpayer would prefer to defer recognition of gain (and
imposition of tax) for as long as possible. Thus, when considering only the resulting
tax consequences, a taxpayer would opt to sell assets with built-in losses early and
often but retain ownership of assets with built-in gains for as long as possible. For
non-tax reasons, however, a taxpayer may desire to retain ownership of an asset with
a built-in loss. If losses recognized upon sale to a related party were deductible, a
taxpayer who held an asset with a built-in loss but desired to retain control of the
asset for non-tax reasons could achieve the best of both worlds by selling the asset
to a related party for a price equal to fair market value. Doing so would allow the
taxpayer to recognize the loss for tax purposes currently, while still maintaining
control over the asset.84 Section 267(a)(1), by disallowing the deduction of any loss
recognized on such a sale, prevents this type of tax-motivated transaction.

84
See Robert I. Keller, At a Loss: A Half Century of Confusion in the Tax Treatment of
Transfers of Depreciated Property Between Related Taxpayers, 44 TAX LAW. 445, 450
(1991) (“[I]n a system of voluntary realization, Congress can reasonably demand that before
a taxpayer be allowed to recognize a loss . . . he transfer title to such property to a person or
entity whose economic interests are not virtually identical to his own.”).
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By contrast, because deferring recognition of tax gain for as long as possible is
generally desirable, a sale at an arms-length price between related parties of an asset
with a built-in gain often will not be tax-motivated.85 Hence, lawmakers’ decision to
refrain from addressing parallel transactions involving gains is an understandable
one.
A sale between related parties that occurs at a price differing from fair market
value could be tax-motivated regardless of whether the sale results in gain or loss.
In particular, if the seller is subject to a higher effective tax rate than the buyer, the
parties might engage in a tax-motivated sale of an asset with a built-in gain by selling
the asset at a below-market price. Doing so would minimize the amount of gain that
is taxed at the seller’s high tax rate and shift some of the gain to the buyer to be
subject to tax at the buyer’s low tax rate upon a subsequent sale by the buyer.86
However, in some cases, this scheme is already addressed by provisions other than
Section 267. For instance, in the case of a sale between related organizations, trades,
or businesses, Section 482 allows the IRS to adjust the effect of the transaction to
reach the result that would follow from a sale at an arms-length price.
If the related parties are individuals and the sale is not a sale that implicates
Section 482 (because it is not a sale between organizations, trades, or businesses),
the transaction would likely be characterized as a part-sale, part-gift transaction. For
instance, consider the following example.
Example 11. Mother acquires stock for $50. As a result, Mother’s basis in the
stock is $50.87 Over time, the stock increases in value to $150. Assume that, if
Mother were to sell the stock and recognize a $100 gain, Mother would incur
tax liability of $15 because Mother’s effective tax rate is 15%. Assume
Daughter’s effective tax rate on gain from sale of the stock would be 0%.
Mother sells the stock to Daughter for $120 ($30 less than fair market value).
85

Such a sale could be tax-motivated in some circumstances. Perhaps the parties predict
that the asset will increase in value further and the buyer is subject to a lower tax rate than
the seller, for instance. In that case, the parties might engage in the sale for tax-motivated
reasons. However, doing so involves taking steps to reduce the expected tax rate applicable
to gains expected in the future (not gains already accrued), and tax law is generally less
hostile to planning decisions made based upon future predictions. For discussion of this
phenomenon generally, see Emily Cauble, Rethinking the Timing of Tax Decisions: Does a
Taxpayer Ever Deserve a Second Chance?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1013 (2012). Such a sale
could also be tax-motivated if there are benefits to the buyer obtaining a high basis in the
property, particularly if the seller can offset resulting gain with existing losses. This
possibility, at least in some situations, is partially addressed by provisions such as Section
1239 of the Internal Revenue Code.
86
By contrast, if the seller is subject to a lower effective tax rate than the buyer, the
parties might engage in a tax-motivated sale of an asset with a built-in loss by selling the
asset at an above-market price. Doing so would minimize the amount of loss recognized by
the seller (who saves little tax from recognizing loss given the seller’s low tax rate) and shift
some of the loss to the buyer to be recognized upon a subsequent sale, saving tax at the
buyer’s high tax rate.
87
See I.R.C. § 1012 (2012).
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The transaction described in Example 11 would likely be treated as, in part, a
sale and, in part, a gift. Under the facts of Example 11, Mother would recognize a
gain from sale of the stock of $70 ($120 minus $50),88 and Daughter would take a
basis in the stock of $120.89 Thus, if Daughter were to subsequently sell the stock
for $150, Daughter would recognize $30 of tax gain. As a result, the parties
succeeded in shifting a portion of the existing built-in gain (in particular $30 of the
$100 built-in gain) from Mother to Daughter. Thus, this type of potentially taxmotivated sale between related parties is not prevented by current law. It is also true
that, under current law, Mother could have transferred the stock to Daughter as a gift
and shifted the entire $100 of built-in gain to Daughter. Thus, the failure to address
tax-motivated transactions involving a sale at a below-market price to a related party
is, in essence, a by-product of not addressing tax-motivated transactions involving
gratuitous transfers of property between related parties. Once lawmakers made the
decision to allow individuals to shift the tax consequences of the entire built-in gain
to related individuals by transferring the property as a gift, logically they would
allow the lesser evil of shifting the tax consequences of only a portion of the builtin gain by selling the property at a below-market price.
In summary, it is possible to rationalize the asymmetric treatment of gains and
losses recognized on sales between related parties. In the case of sales that occur at
an arms-length price, greater potential for tax-motivated transactions involving
losses offers a rationale for the disparate treatment. In the case of sales that occur at
a price that differs from fair market value, the potential for tax-motivated
transactions involving gains is either already addressed by other provisions (like
Section 482) or is not addressed (in the case of part-gift, part-sale transactions).
However, in the latter case, the failure to address the potential for tax-motivated
transactions is a logical extension of the failure to address the same potential for taxmotivated transactions in the context of gifts of built-in gain property.
Thus, greater potential for tax-motivated transactions involving losses can
explain the decision to address losses but not gains in the context of sales between
related parties. Some of the parameters of Section 267(a)(1) are not perfectly
designed to achieve the goal of preventing tax-motivated transactions. However, in
general terms, the decision to address losses but not gains in this context is a sensible
one.
Section 267(a)(1) is not perfectly designed to achieve the objective of
preventing tax-motivated transactions involving losses because it can be overly
broad.90 Related parties might engage in a sale of property that had declined in value
for non-tax reasons alone, but, even though such a sale is not tax motivated, Section
88

See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001–1(e) (2017).
See id. § 1.1015–4.
90
A preferable solution would involve abandoning the realization requirement and
requiring taxpayers to report gains and losses on a mark-to-market basis. In such a system,
the timing of a sale would have no effect on tax consequences, and so tax-motivation would
not encourage or discourage a sale. However, this Article takes as a given the realization
requirement.
89
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267(a)(1) prevents deduction of the resulting loss. In addition, Section 267(a)(1)
may be harsher than necessary even in the case of a tax-motivated transaction. In
particular, not only does the provision prevent deduction of the loss at the time of
the sale to a related party, but, in many cases, it prevents the taxpayers from
deducting the loss forever. Consider, for instance, the following example.
Example 12. Mother acquires stock for $50. As a result, Mother’s basis in the
stock is $50.91 Mother sells the stock to Daughter for $20 at a time when the
stock is worth $20. Mother recognizes $30 of loss from the sale, but Mother
cannot deduct the $30 loss.92 Daughter’s basis in the stock will be $20 (cost
basis). If Daughter sells the stock for $20, Daughter recognizes no loss (because
$20 is not less than her $20 basis). Thus, the $30 loss that accrued while Mother
held the stock cannot be recognized by Mother and is never recognized because
Daughter takes a cost basis in the stock.93
The purpose of preventing tax-motivated sales involving losses could be
achieved in a less severe way. In particular, tax law could allow Mother to deduct
the loss recognized upon sale to Daughter but defer the time at which she deducts
the loss until the time that Daughter sells the property to a third party. This approach,
however, would present administrative difficulties similar to those discussed below
in connection with a similar hypothetical approach to treating property transferred
by gift.94
4. Section 362(e)(2)
As described above in Part II.B, if built-in loss property is contributed to a
corporation in a transaction in which the loss is not recognized at the time of the
contribution, Section 362(e)(2) provides that the loss will be preserved only once
(either in the stock held by the shareholder or in the asset held by the corporation).
This treatment prevents the duplication (for tax purposes) of an existing economic
loss. By contrast, if built-in gain property is contributed to a corporation in a
transaction in which the gain is not recognized, the gain is duplicated for tax
purposes. It will be preserved in the stock held by the shareholder and in the asset
held by the corporation. This inconsistent treatment could be explained by the
greater potential for tax-motivated transactions involving assets with built-in losses.
91

See I.R.C. § 1012 (2012).
See id. § 267(a)(1).
93
The loss would only be utilized by Daughter to offset resulting gain if the stock
increased in value in the Daughter’s hands. If Daughter sold the stock for $60, Daughter
would recognize a gain of $10, because Daughter can offset the $40 gain recognized ($60
minus $20 basis) by the $30 loss that Mother recognized and could not deduct. See I.R.C. §
267(d)(1)(B) (2012). The resulting treatment, in effect, parallels the treatment that follows
from a gift of property with a built-in loss. See supra note 22.
94
See infra notes 111–117 and accompanying text. See also Keller, supra note 84, at
463 (discussing a similar possible approach to sales between related parties).
92
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In particular, imagine a taxpayer acquires an asset and anticipates that the asset
will increase in value. Such a taxpayer might initially hold the asset directly, rather
than through an entity treated like a corporation for tax purposes.95 If the asset does
appreciate in value, the taxpayer could continue to hold the asset directly so that,
when the taxpayer sold the asset, the economic gain realized would only result in
one tax gain (rather than two levels of tax gain which would occur if the asset was
always held through a corporation or if the asset was contributed to a corporation
after the appreciation in value occurred). If, contrary to the taxpayer’s initial
expectations, the asset depreciated in value, the taxpayer could contribute the asset
to a corporation, and, absent Section 362(e)(2), the one economic loss would result
in recognition of two tax losses (rather than just one tax loss, which would occur if
the taxpayer continued to hold the asset directly).96
Section 362(e)(2) prevents this type of tax-motivated transaction.97 Given the
existence of Section 362(e)(2), if the taxpayer initially holds an asset directly based
on the assumption that it will appreciate in value and, instead, the asset depreciates
in value, the taxpayer typically cannot create two tax losses from the one existing
economic loss. Regardless of whether the taxpayer continues to hold the asset
directly or contributes it to a corporation, only one tax loss can be recognized as a
result of the existing economic loss.
By contrast, adopting a parallel provision related to gains would be unlikely to
dissuade taxpayers from engaging in tax-motivated contributions of built-in gain
property to corporations. This is not to say that a taxpayer cannot have a tax reason
to contribute property with a built-in gain to a corporation. Rather, the point is that
if a taxpayer already has a tax reason to contribute an appreciated asset to a
95

Alternatively, the taxpayer may hold the asset through an entity (such as a limited
liability company) that is disregarded as separate from the taxpayer for tax purposes.
96
Even absent I.R.C. § 362(e)(2), this strategy could be subject to a potentially
successful challenge by the IRS. In particular, if the asset were sold very shortly after the
individual contributed the asset to the corporation, the Service could claim that transaction
should be treated as if the individual, rather than the corporation, had sold the asset, so that
only one loss would be recognized. Such a challenge is more likely to be successful if the
corporation distributes the cash from sale of the asset to the shareholder very soon after the
sale. The likelihood of a successful challenge would also increase if the individual had
negotiated the sale of the asset to the third party prior to contributing the asset to the
corporation. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Court Holding, 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (characterizing
the sale by a shareholder of an asset following its distribution by a corporation as, instead, a
sale of the asset by the corporation).
97
The legislative history surrounding the enactment of Section 362(e)(2) also supports
the conclusion that its goal was preventing duplication of an existing loss. See S. REP. NO.
108-192, at 125 (2003) (“The Joint Committee on Taxation staff’s investigative report of
Enron Corporation and other information reveal that taxpayers are engaging in various tax
motivated transactions to duplicate a single economic loss and, subsequently, deduct such
loss more than once. . . . [T]he Committee believes that a single economic loss should not be
deducted more than once.”); see also Kahn & Kahn, supra note 67, at 47 (“It seems to the
authors that the objection centers on the potential for a manipulative transfer of depreciated
assets to be made for the principal purpose of doubling the use of the excess basis.”).
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corporation, the taxpayer would have even more of a tax reason (or, certainly, no
less of a tax reason) to engage in the same transaction if the contribution would not
result in the duplication of the gain for tax purposes.98
The parameters of Section 362(e)(2) could be adjusted so that it better serves
the goal of preventing tax-motivated transactions that result in loss duplication.
However, in general terms, lawmakers’ decision to address losses but not gains, in
this context, can be understood as an attempt to focus on the type of duplication
(losses not gains) that is more likely to provide a tax-related inducement to
contribute property to a corporation.
As mentioned above, Section 362(e)(2) is not perfectly designed for the goal of
preventing tax-motivated contributions of built-in loss property.99 First, it does not
necessarily discriminate between contributions that duplicate a loss and
contributions that do not duplicate a loss; and, second, it does not necessarily sort
between tax-motivated contributions and non-tax-motivated contributions.100
Regarding the first flaw, Section 362(e)(2) applies on an aggregated basis.
Thus, if a shareholder contributes one asset that has a basis of $100 and a fair market
value of $40 and, at the same time, contributes a second asset that has a basis of
$100 and a fair market value of $160, Section 362(e)(2) will not apply because the
total basis of all assets contributed ($200) is not more than the total value of all assets
contributed ($200). It does not apply even though this transaction might have been
designed to reap a greater benefit from an accrued loss (if, for instance, the taxpayer
planned to contribute the built-in gain asset for non-tax reasons and decided to

98

For a proposal regarding how tax law could be modified to prevent gain duplication,
see Mock & Tolin, supra note 12, at 154–55.
99
Section 362(e)(2) is also flawed in the context of S Corporations, where the ability
to elect to reduce a shareholder’s basis in stock rather than the corporation’s basis in an asset
allows loss to be shifted from the contributing shareholder to other shareholders. See, e.g.,
Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Daniel L. Simmons, When Subchapter S Meets Subchapter C, 67
TAX L. 231, 245–46 (2014).
100
See also Kahn & Kahn, supra note 67, at 47 (“It seems to the authors that the
objection centers on the potential for a manipulative transfer of depreciated assets to be made
for the principal purpose of doubling the use of the excess basis. If, instead, the depreciated
property were transferred primarily for a business purpose, the doubling of the use of the
excess basis would merely be an element of the system adopted for the treatment of section
351 exchanges and does not warrant any restrictive treatment.”) It might also be the case that
contributions that are entirely tax-motivated should not receive non-recognition treatment in
the first place, so that section 362(e)(2) is unnecessary. For further discussion, see id. at 48–
49 (“There is authority that a condition of qualifying an exchange with a corporation for
section 351 treatment is that a bona fide purpose of the exchange be a non-tax business
purpose. It seems likely that when there is a manipulative tax purpose for making a transfer
to a corporation of a depreciated asset, that purpose will be evident in most cases, and
especially so when the depreciated asset is sold soon after the corporation acquires it.
Consequently, the abusive use of the doubling of excess basis rule will not be possible
because the exchange with the corporation will not qualify for section 351 treatment (or for
the accompanying basis rules).”).
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include the built-in loss asset in the transaction for tax reasons).101 Section 362(e)(2)
would be more precisely targeted to the goal of preventing tax-motivated
contributions if it applied asset-by-asset rather than on an aggregated basis. Thus, in
the example above, it would apply to the asset with a basis of $100 and a fair market
value of $40, even if it was contributed at the same time as other assets with an
offsetting amount of built-in gain.
Regarding the second flaw, Section 362(e)(2) does not necessarily discriminate
between contributions that are tax-motivated and contributions that are not taxmotivated because it conclusively presumes that any contribution of assets that have
a net built-in loss is tax-motivated.102 Thus, if a shareholder contributes one asset
that has a basis of $100 and a fair market value of $40, Section 362(e)(2) effectively
assumes that the shareholder’s contribution is tax-motivated even though it is
possible that the shareholder contributes the asset to the corporation to obtain nontax benefits. To remedy this shortcoming, Professors Kahn & Kahn have suggested,
among other potential solutions, that if a shareholder contributes built-in loss
property to a corporation and the corporation sells the property within some fairly
short period of time, those facts would establish a presumption that the contribution
was tax-motivated so that loss duplication would be disallowed; however, the
presumption would be rebuttable rather than conclusive.103
B. Difficulty of Crafting an Appropriate Parallel Provision
As discussed above in Part III.A, in the context of two examples (the first
involving gifts and the second involving property contributed to a partnership), tax
law takes steps to prevent tax-motivated transactions involving losses but not gains,
despite the fact that there is no greater danger of tax-motivated transactions in the
101
See also Mock & Tolin, supra note 12, at 130 (“If enough gain property is
transferred, loss duplication is not restricted. Section 362(e)(2) does not apply when the
aggregate fair market value of the transferred properties equals or exceeds the aggregate
adjusted bases of the assets transferred. For this to work, the shareholder must have sufficient
gain property to transfer and such must be part of the economic bargain.”).
102
See also Kahn & Kahn, supra note 67, at 48 (“The authors agree that it is appropriate
for Congress to prevent manipulation of ownership for the principal purpose of doubling a
deduction. However, the principal statutory provision aimed at that problem, section
362(e)(2), is overly broad. It improperly applies to situations. . . even when the transferor’s
principal reason for contributing the depreciated asset to the corporation was non-tax profit
motivated.”).
103
See id. at 49 (“If Congress is concerned that a business purpose rule [discussed above
in note 100] will not be adopted by some courts, it could address that issue by expressly
adding that requirement to section 351. That approach would attack a narrow problem with
a scalpel rather than with an axe. If Congress is concerned that the vagaries of factual
determinations may permit too many taxpayers to establish a business purpose when none
actually exists, Congress could impose a greater burden of proof on taxpayers on that issue
or create a rebuttable presumption that if a transferred depreciated asset is sold by the
corporation within some specified time period, such as two years, the transfer to the
corporation will be presumed to be tax motivated.”).
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loss context than in the gain context. Therefore, a heightened risk of tax-motivated
transactions involving losses cannot satisfactorily explain the inconsistent treatment
in these contexts. Perhaps, instead, the inconsistent treatment arises because of the
difficulty of crafting symmetrical provisions to address tax-motivated transactions
involving gains. This part will explore this possibility in the context of each of the
two examples, in turn.
1. Basis in Property Received by Gift
When an individual holds property that has either fallen in value or appreciated
in value and gives the property to another individual, there are, in general, six ways
that tax law could treat the transaction:104
(1) Option 1. Tax law could treat the disposition of the property as an event
that causes the donor to recognize any gain or loss built into the property. In
other words, at the time of the gift, the donor would be treated as if he or she
had sold the property for its fair market value. The donor would be required to
include the resulting gain in income, and the donor could deduct the resulting
loss notwithstanding Section 267(a)(1), even if the donee was a related person.
The donee would take a basis in the property equal to the fair market value at
the time of the gift, so that the donee would recognize gain or loss on a
subsequent sale only if the property increased or decreased in value in the
donee’s hands.
(2) Option 2. Option 2 is the same as Option 1105 except that the donor’s ability
to deduct the resulting loss would be constrained by Section 267(a)(1),
discussed above in Part II.A.106
(3) Option 3. At the time of the gift, the donor does not recognize any gain or
loss. The donee takes a basis in the property equal to the donor’s basis for
purposes of determining gain or loss recognized upon a subsequent sale by the
donee.
(4) Option 4. At the time of the gift, the donor does not recognize any gain or
loss. The donee takes a basis in the property equal to fair market value at the
time of the gift for purposes of determining gain or loss recognized upon a
subsequent sale by the donee.
(5) Option 5. At the time of the gift, the donor does not recognize any gain or
loss. The donee takes a basis in the property equal to fair market value at the
time of the gift for purposes of determining gain or loss recognized upon a
subsequent sale by the donee. In addition, at the time the donee sells the
104

The options below take, as a given, that the U.S. does not adopt a mark-to-market
system for taking into account changes in asset value.
105
Professor Kwall has made a proposal that would be equivalent to Option 2. See
Kwall, supra note 2.
106
The donee’s subsequent gain or loss would be determined under rules similar to
those contained in Section 267 discussed above. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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property, the donor will recognize any built-in gain or loss that existed in the
property at the time of the gift.107
(6) Option 6. Option 6 is the approach taken by current law. In particular, at
the time of the gift, the donor does not recognize any gain or loss. The donee
takes a basis in the property equal to the donor’s basis for purposes of
determining gain recognized upon a subsequent sale by the donee, but, if the
property has a built-in loss at the time of the gift, the donee takes a basis in the
property equal to fair market value at the time of the gift for purposes of
determining loss recognized upon subsequent sale.
Of the possibilities described above, the only options that treat built-in gain
property and built-in loss property symmetrically are Options 1, 3, 4, and 5. Option
1, however, invites tax-motivated gifts of built-in loss property. Option 4 provides
leeway to engage in tax-motivated gifts involving built-in gain property to such a
degree that it would be entirely untenable, and Option 3 enables tax-motivated gifts
involving both built-in gains and built-in losses. Option 5 addresses gains and losses
in a symmetrical fashion and prevents tax-motivated gifts involving either type of
property. However, it would be challenging to administer. Option 2 deters taxmotivated gifts involving both built-in gain property and built-in loss property, but
it does so in a way that is asymmetrical. Although this asymmetry is not necessarily
problematic from a policy perspective,108 it may present a formidable obstacle from
a political perspective. In particular, lawmakers’ failure to adopt this approach
might be explained by concerns about adopting a provision that seemed overly
draconian. Each of these observations is explained in more detail below.
Option 1 invites tax-motivated gifts of built-in loss property. By allowing the
donor to recognize and deduct a loss at the time of the gift, this regime could
encourage individuals to donate depreciated property to relatives in order to
accelerate the time at which a loss was recognized without giving up genuine control
of the property because the property would continue to be held by a relative. In other
words, Option 1 would allow taxpayers to circumvent the purpose of Section
107

Professor Keller also discussed this as a possible option, and, in addition, suggested
that this approach could be used only when the subsequent sale happened within a short time
of the gift (perhaps because that suggests the gift was tax-motivated) and, if the subsequent
sale happened later, Option 3 could provide the applicable tax treatment. See Keller, supra
note 84, at 455. For additional discussion of this possibility, see Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey
H. Kahn, “Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts” – The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private
and Charitable “Gifts” and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from
Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441, 473 (2003) (“Congress could have provided that the
donee’s gain on a disposition of the donated asset would be taxed to the donor to the extent
attributable to the appreciation at the time of the gift.”). As a related alternative, the donee
could be taxed at the time of the later sale, but the donor’s tax rate could be applied to the
gain (at least to the extent of the built-in gain that existed at the time of the gift). For
discussion of this possibility, see id. (“Alternatively, it could be taxed to the donee at the
marginal tax rate at which it would have been taxed to the donor.”).
108
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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267(a)(1), discussed above in Parts II.A and III.A.3, by simply giving away property
to a relative rather than selling it to that same person. For these reasons, Option 1 is
not a feasible approach.
Option 4 provides leeway to engage in tax-motivated gifts involving built-in
gain property. In particular, anytime a taxpayer held an asset that appreciated in
value, he or she could avoid paying tax on the gain through the simple maneuver of
giving the property to a related taxpayer for that related person to sell it. The donor
would not recognize the built-in gain in the property, and the related person would
recognize no gain on sale, given that his or her basis would equal fair market value.
Thus, Option 4 is entirely untenable.109
Option 3 enables tax-motivated gifts involving both built-in gains and losses.
Like current law, it allows related taxpayers to reduce their aggregate tax liability by
having a taxpayer with a higher effective tax rate make a gift of appreciated property
to a taxpayer with a lower effective tax rate, so that, on subsequent sale, the built-in
gain is taxed at the donee’s lower tax rate instead of the donor’s higher tax rate.
Unlike current law, it would also allow related taxpayers to reduce their aggregative
tax liability by making gifts of built-in loss property in the opposite direction (in
other words, from a taxpayer subject to a lower effective tax rate to a taxpayer
subject to a higher effective tax rate, so that more tax would be saved when the donee
recognized the resulting loss than the tax that would have been saved had the donor
recognized the loss).110
Option 5 treats gains and losses symmetrically, and it prevents tax-motivated
gifts of both built-in gain property and built-in loss property. In order to demonstrate,
consider the following examples.
Example 13. Mother acquires stock for $50. Over time, the stock increases in
value to $150. When the stock is worth $150, Mother gives the stock to
Daughter. Mother does not recognize any gain at the time of the gift. Daughter
later sells the stock to a third party for $180. At the time of the sale to the third
party, Daughter would recognize $30 of gain (the appreciation in the stock’s
value that accrued while Daughter held the stock), and Mother would recognize
$100 of gain as if she had sold the stock to the third party for a $100 gain (so
that Mother is taxed on the $100 increase in value that occurred while she
109
See also Joseph M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization Approach Is Superior to
Carryover Basis (and Avoids Most of the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L.
REV. 421, 432 (2001) (“If the basis-equals-value rule were to apply to gifts as well as to
bequests, families and friends would be able to ‘launder’ all taxable gain out of the system
at will by making inter vivos gifts among themselves of appreciated assets.”). As Professor
Zelenak notes, prior to 1921, Option 4 was the law in that the donee received fair market
value basis in property received by gift. LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FIGURING OUT THE TAX:
CONGRESS, TREASURY, AND THE DESIGN OF THE EARLY MODERN INCOME TAX 92 (2018).
110
Because of the current tax treatment of gifts of built-in loss property, well-advised
taxpayers likely do not transfer built-in loss property by gift. However, if the tax treatment
were changed so that losses could be shifted to related taxpayers, well-advised taxpayers
might very well engage in such transactions.
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owned the stock).111 Thus, if Daughter’s tax rate is lower than Mother’s tax
rate, the parties are no longer able to engage in a tax-motivated gift to shift the
$100 built-in gain from a high-tax-rate individual to a low-tax-rate individual.
Example 14. Mother acquires stock for $50. Over time, the stock falls in value
to $30. When the stock is worth $30, Mother gives the stock to Daughter.
Mother does not recognize any loss at the time of the gift. Daughter later sells
the stock to a third party for $25.112 At the time of the sale to the third party,
Daughter would recognize $5 of loss (the decline in the stock’s value that
transpired while Daughter held the stock), and Mother would recognize $20 of
loss as if she had sold the stock to the third party for a $20 loss (so that Mother
recognizes a loss attributable to the fall in value that occurred while she owned
the stock). Thus, if Daughter’s tax rate is higher than Mother’s tax rate, the
parties cannot engage in a tax-motivated gift to shift the $20 built-in loss from
a low-tax-rate individual to a high-tax-rate individual. At the same time, as a
comparison with Example 13 demonstrates, gains and losses would be treated
in a symmetrical fashion, unlike under current law.
Of all of the options discussed, Option 5 is the only one that both achieves the
goal of preventing tax-motivated gifts of built-in gain property and built-in loss
property and does so in a fashion that treats gains and losses consistently. However,
Option 5 would be challenging to administer. Professor Keller, when discussing this
potential approach, observed that it would present two practical problems: (1) it
would require valuation of the property at the time of the gift and (2) it would
“require[] the donor to keep track indefinitely of what the donee does with the
property.”113
The first problem might not be as serious as it first appears. As Professor Kwall
observes, the parties likely already value property (at least in an approximate sense)
at the time of a gift for non-tax reasons. As Professor Kwall writes,
When property is transferred, the transferor will normally confront
the question of valuation regardless of whether the tax system mandates
valuation at the time of transfer. For example, when a donor decides to
make a gift, the donor will normally determine the amount of the gift
111

If Daughter instead sold the stock to a third party for $140, Daughter would
recognize a $10 loss on sale of the stock (the decline in value that occurred while Daughter
owned the stock), and, at the time of the sale to a third party, Mother would still recognize
$100 of gain as if she had sold the stock to the third party for a $100 gain (so that Mother is
taxed on the $100 increase in value that occurred while she owned the stock).
112
If Daughter instead sold the stock to a third party for $37, Daughter would recognize
a $7 gain on sale of the stock (the rise in value that occurred while Daughter owned the
stock), and, at the time of the sale to a third party, Mother would still recognize $20 of loss
as if she had sold the stock to the third party for a $20 loss (so that Mother recognizes a loss
attributable to the fall in value that occurred while she owned the stock).
113
Keller, supra note 84, at 455.
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before making it. In the case of a cash gift, the donor must decide a specific
amount to give (unless she simply reaches into her pocket and hands over
a wad of cash). In the case of a gift of property, the donor is also likely to
go through a mental process of valuing the property before she conveys it.
Although a donor would not normally secure a professional appraisal of
the gifted property, the donor undoubtedly will engage in a conscious or
unconscious exercise of determining that the property in question is within
a range of values that the donor is inclined to bestow on a particular
donee.114
Second, as Professor Kwall observes, there may be tax reasons why taxpayers
already value property at the time of the gift, in particular because federal and state
transfer taxes might be imposed.115 Finally, even under current law, valuation at the
time of the gift is required for income tax purposes if the property has a built-in loss
(because, in that event, the donee’s basis in the property will be fair market value at
the time of the gift for purposes of determining loss on a subsequent sale), and, in
all cases, at least approximate valuation would be required to determine whether the
property has a built-in loss (so that the donee would know whether the special basis
rule related to losses applied).
However, the second problem may be more serious—namely, Option 5 would
require the donor to monitor, indefinitely, whether or not the donee has disposed of
the property received by gift. This difficulty might not be insurmountable—after all,
the parties are not likely to be strangers.116 Furthermore, steps could be taken to
facilitate the donor receiving the relevant information (for instance, the donee could
be subject to an information reporting obligation to provide the donor with notice of
the date of a subsequent sale). However, Option 5, undeniably, involves greater
administrative complexity than current law.117
If Option 5 is too difficult to administer, the remaining viable options are
current law (Option 6) and Option 2. Current law addresses tax-motivated gifts of
built-in loss property but not tax-motivated gifts of built-in gain property. Option 2
prevents tax-motivated gifts of both built-in gain property and built-in loss property.
However, it does so in an inconsistent fashion. In particular, in the case of a gift of
built-in gain property, the donor would be required to recognize the gain at the time
of the gift (so that the gain would be subject to tax at the donor’s tax rate), but if the
parties were related, in the case of a gift of built-in loss property, the donor would
not receive a deduction for the built-in loss and, in some circumstances, no party
would ever receive a reduction in tax liability as a result of the existing built-in
loss.118 The latter result (the treatment of built-in losses) is the same as what occurs
114

Kwall, supra note 2, at 97–98.
Id. at 97.
116
Although, it is possible that they could be.
117
This would be particularly true if the donee, in turn, transfers the property to another
individual by gift.
118
The donee would only receive a benefit from the accrued loss if the property
increased in value in the donee’s hands. In that case, Section 267(d) allows the donee to
115
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under current law. However, the former result (taxing the donor on built-in gain at
the time of the gift) differs from current law (under which the donor is not taxed on
the built-in gain, but, instead, the donee is potentially taxed on the built-in gain at
the time of a later sale).
It might be that lawmakers, once they decided to deny any tax benefit to any
built-in loss that exists at the time of a gift, did not have the appetite for also insisting
that donors recognize any built-in gain that exists at the time of the gift.119 It might
also be that they feared adopting tax rules that would discourage gifts that would
have been made for non-tax reasons. Thus, the result of current law might be
explained as what remains after the elimination of other alternatives that either do a
poorer job of preventing tax motivated transactions, are infeasible for administrative
reasons, or are impractical for political reasons.
From a policy perspective, as discussed above, consistency should not be a goal
for consistency’s sake.120 However, lawmakers concerned with preventing taxmotivated gifts should not ignore the potential for tax-motivated gifts of built-in gain
property. To address such transactions, lawmakers ought to adopt either Option 2 or
Option 5. Because of the inherent administrative difficulties, Option 5 may be
inferior from a policy perspective. However, the political difficulties of adopting
Option 2 cannot be ignored, and these difficulties stem, in part, from the fact that the
asymmetric treatment it entails brings the harsh treatment of losses into sharper
focus.
2. Subsequent Sale of Property Contributed to a Partnership
As described above in Part III.B.1, in the context of gifts, law’s inconsistent
treatment of gains and losses might arise because of the difficulty of crafting a
symmetrical provision to address tax motivated transactions involving gains. In the
context of property that is contributed to a partnership, this explanation is less
satisfying. A ready solution exists that would limit, in symmetrical fashion, the
ability to shift the tax consequences of both built-in gains and built-in losses from a
contributing partner to other partners. In particular, lawmakers could require that
partnerships use the “remedial method” for making Section 704(c) allocations. In
many ways, this solution parallels Option 5 for the treatment of gifts discussed above

reduce the amount of gain recognized by the loss that the donor could not deduct.
119
In the context of the sale of property between related taxpayers, lawmakers do take
the approach of requiring gain recognition but disallowing tax benefits for any resulting loss,
in many cases. See the discussion of Section 267 above in Part II.A. However, in the context
of the sale of property for consideration, there is less political resistance to the idea of
imposing tax on the resulting gain than there is in the context of gratuitous transfers of
property. See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 2, at 99–100 (discussing political resistance to a markto-market system and stating, “The view that ‘paper gains’ should not be taxed is firmly
embedded in the current culture, and it would be very difficult to mobilize popular support
for a system that taxes asset appreciation as it occurs.”).
120
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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in Part III.B.1.121 Under Option 5, upon ultimate sale of the property by the donee,
the donor would recognize whatever amount of built-in gain or built-in loss existed
in the property at the time of the gift, and the donee would recognize gain or loss
based on any increase or decrease that occurred in the property’s value while held
by the donee. If a partnership uses the “remedial method” for making Section 704(c)
allocations, upon ultimate sale of the property by the partnership, the contributing
partner would recognize whatever amount of built-in gain or built-in loss existed in
the property at the time of the contribution, and each partner would recognize gain
or loss based on such partner’s share of any increase or decrease that occurred in the
property’s value while held by the partnership.122
The practical objections to utilizing Option 5 in the context of gifts carry
significantly less weight when evaluating the merits of adopting a similar approach
in the partnership context. As discussed above, one objection raised in the gift
context is that the method requires that the parties value the property at the time of
the gift.123 In the partnership context, perhaps even more so than in the gift context,
the parties would value the property at the time it is contributed to a partnership for
non-tax reasons even if they were not required to do so for tax reasons. Even for
gifts, parties might obtain an approximate value, as discussed above.124 In the
partnership context, assuming the partners are unrelated, business considerations
would require a valuation at the time of the contribution to determine the partners’
economic rights.125 Furthermore, in the partnership context, valuation of the property
at the time of the contribution is required to properly apply any method under
Section 704(c), not just the remedial method.126

121

For discussion of another approach that would have similar effects and bears even
more similarity to Option 5, see Monroe, supra note 54 (discussing the deferred sale method).
For an additional proposal to prevent shifting of tax gains and losses, see Osofsky, supra
note 43, at 107 (“For the reasons suggested in this article, Congress, if not the Treasury
Department, should take this step and finally unwind the ceiling rule itself.”). See also
Gregory J. Marich, Barksdale Hortenstine & Barksdale Penick, The Remedial Allocation
Method: A Viable Cure for the Ceiling Rule, 65 TAX NOTES 1267, 1290 (1994) (“[T]here are
still some bugs that need to be worked out of the remedial method . . . In any event, whatever
course is taken, we believe that the remedial method represents a long overdue and relatively
manageable cure to the ceiling rule.”).
122
The results are somewhat more complex if the property is depreciable.
123
See supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.
124
Id.
125
For further discussion, see Cauble, supra note 36, at 299–300 (“[A] partnership
needs to value an asset at the time it is contributed to a partnership in order to effectuate the
economic deal among the partners. If A and B form a partnership, where A contributes land
to the partnership, B contributes cash to the partnership, and the partners intend to share
equally in the economic returns of the partnership, the partners will need to value the land in
order to determine how much cash B should contribute.”).
126
For further discussion, see id. at 299. In addition, as Professor Monroe observes,
valuation is necessary if a partnership maintains capital accounts in accordance with the
regulations under Section 704. See Monroe, supra note 54, at 1433–44.
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As discussed above, another objection to implementing Option 5 in the gift
context is that it would require the donor to monitor whether the donee has sold the
property. In the partnership context, the partnership will already be tracking when
the partnership sells the property and will already be reporting to the contributing
partner the correct amount of tax gain or loss to take into account at that time.
Historical resistance to a requirement that partnerships use the “remedial
method” or a similar approach has been driven, in part, by the view that use of such
a method is overly complex.127 The perceived complexity stems from two sources.
First, the requirement that the property must be valued at the time of contribution
causes complexity.128 However, as discussed above, valuation must occur under any
Section 704(c) method and for non-tax reasons. Second, the method is viewed as
computationally complex.129 However, as I have argued elsewhere, requiring use of
the remedial method would not increase tax law’s complexity in any meaningful
way, and could, in some respects, simplify existing partnership tax law.130
Complexity can affect taxpayers at two different points in time—first, when a
taxpayer contemplates engaging in a transaction and seeks to predict its tax
consequences and, second, when a taxpayer must report the tax consequences of a
transaction in which it has already engaged. The additional computational
complexity inherent in the remedial method may somewhat increase the difficulty
of calculating the tax consequences that a taxpayer must report; however, any
additional difficulty can be ameliorated by tax software.131 At the planning stage, the
remedial method may actually be easier than the traditional method in that it results
in tax consequences corresponding more closely to economic consequences, a result
that is likely more consistent with most taxpayers’ intuitive expectations.132
Furthermore, requiring use of the remedial method simplifies planning by obviating
the need to evaluate the results of multiple methods.
IV. OVERLY NARROW LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
As discussed above, tax law takes steps to prevent transactions that would
involve shifting built-in losses but allows transactions that involve shifting built-in
gains in the context of property transferred by gift and, in some cases, in the context
of property contributed to a partnership. This asymmetric treatment prevails despite
the fact that there is no greater danger of tax-motivated transactions involving losses
than tax-motivated transactions involving gains. Therefore, a heightened risk of tax127

Treasury also did not mandate use of this method, in part, because of a belief that it
lacked authority to do so. However, even if this belief is correct, Congress could require use
of the method. For further discussion, see Laura Cunningham, Use and Abuse of Section
704(c), 3 FLA. TAX REV. 93, 116–17 (1996); Cauble, supra note 36, at 272; Osofsky, supra
note 43, at 107.
128
See Cauble, supra note 36, at n.82–83 and accompanying text.
129
See id. at n.84 and accompanying text.
130
See id. at 291–301.
131
Id.
132
Id.
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motivated transactions involving losses cannot satisfactorily explain the inconsistent
treatment in these contexts. In the gift context, the inconsistent treatment might arise
because of the practical difficulty of crafting symmetrical provisions to address taxmotivated transactions involving gains. However, a similar rationale does not
provide a satisfactory explanation for the lack of parallel treatment in the partnership
context, and, even in the gift context, it is not clear that the practical or political
considerations should outweigh concerns about the possibility of tax-motivated
transactions involving gains. Asymmetric treatment, in both of these contexts,
might, in part, be attributable to lawmakers crafting an overly narrow response that
addressed only the tax-revenue reducing transactions that were the most salient at
the time of enactment.
As Professor Keller observed, 1934, the year in which Congress adopted the
current rules governing basis in property received by gift, was a year “in which
Congress was obsessed with the potential effect of taxpayer losses on the revenue of
the United States.”133 This obsession stemmed from the fact that, during the Great
Depression when the rules were enacted, investment losses were much more
common than investment gains. As Professor Keller observed, “[g]iven this concern
with losses in 1934, the [rules regarding basis in property received by gift] may
simply have been a knee-jerk, unreasoned reaction to the revenue problem, with
Congress giving no thought whatever to the fact that it was closing one door [to tax
planning opportunities involving gifts of built-in loss property] . . . while leaving the
other wide open [for tax planning opportunities involving gifts of built-in gain
property].”134
133

Keller, supra note 84, at 457.
Id. Professor Keller goes on to note that lawmakers may have been particularly
concerned about the ability to shift losses because, at the time that they were drafting the
new basis rules, limitations on the ability to deduct capital losses were not yet in place. Id. at
458. Given the amount of time that has elapsed, this explanation likely does not account for
the continuing failure to address tax-motivated gifts of built-in gain property. Instead, this
continuing failure might be explained, in part, by the practical and political difficulties of
addressing built-in gain property discussed above in Part III.B and, in part, by the fact that
the ability to reduce tax liability through gifts is somewhat limited because most gifts involve
the transfer of capital assets and the tax rates that apply to net capital gain are not as steeply
graduated as those that apply to ordinary income. Furthermore, in some cases, the “kiddie
tax” of Section 1(g) of the Internal Revenue Code would limit the tax savings from such
transfers. In addition, in some cases, gift tax may be imposed on the transfer which could act
as an impediment to tax-motivated gifts. Furthermore, if the donor held the property until
death, the recipient would inherit the property with a fair market value basis under Section
1014, so that the built-in gain would escape income tax altogether. Therefore, compared to a
baseline that involves subjecting the gain to no income tax at all, subjecting it to tax at a
lower rate may not seem like significant tax avoidance. In addition, the current treatment
may persist because of a decision to treat the donor and the donee as one taxpaying unit with
respect to gift property (at least when it does not have a built-in loss at the time of the gift).
For further discussion of this view, see Kahn & Kahn, supra note 107, at 471–73. The current
tax treatment of gifts may also be attributable, in part, to the long-standing nature of the
existing rules. See generally Zelenak, supra note 109 (providing a further discussion of their
134
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In the partnership context, lawmakers’ obsession with losses is more puzzling
because they did not appear to have in mind any particular transaction in which
losses were shifted among partners. In fact, at least one high profile transaction
undertaken by sophisticated parties involved shifting the tax consequences between
partners of income from contributed property rather than loss.135 It may be that
lawmakers were focused on losses because other transactions undertaken at the time,
outside of the partnership context, involved losses. For example, transactions
undertaken by Enron that were part of the apparent impetus for adopting Section
362(e)(2) (preventing duplication of tax losses in the corporate context)136 might
have also inspired a fixation on the potential to shift losses in the partnership context.
Thus, lawmakers apparently had enough foresight to look beyond tax-motivated loss
transactions in the corporate context to anticipate tax-motivated loss transactions in
the partnership context. However, it appears that their powers of prediction may
have only extended that far, as they did not address parallel tax-motivated
transactions involving gains in the partnership context.
CONCLUSION
In certain instances, a taxpayer is prevented from shifting a built-in loss to
another taxpayer but would be allowed to shift a built-in gain to another taxpayer.
This occurs in the context of property transferred by gift and in the context of
property contributed to a partnership. The inconsistency prevails despite the fact that
no greater potential for tax-motivated transactions involving losses exists to
potentially justify the disparate treatment. Instead of being based upon a sound
policy justification, it is possible that the uneven treatment is merely an artifact of
lawmakers crafting an overly narrow response that addressed only the most highprofile threat to the tax base.

history).
135

See supra note 38.
See supra note 97. See also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REP. OF
INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORP. 18 (Comm. Print 2003) (“[T]he Joint Committee Staff
makes the following specific recommendations . . . [t]he duplication of losses should be
curtailed so that a single economic loss is not deducted more than once . . . .”).
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